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Terrorizing Academia
Joseph Margulies and Hope Metcalf
I. Introduction
In an observation more often repeated than defended, we are told that the 
attacks of September 11 “changed everything.” Whatever merit there is in this 
notion, it is certainly true that 9/11—and in particular the legal response set in 
motion by the administration of President George W. Bush—left its mark on 
the academy.
Nine years after 9/11, it is time to step back and assess these developments 
and to offer thoughts on their meaning. In Part II of this essay, we analyze 
the post-9/11 scholarship produced by this “emergency” framing. We argue 
that legal scholars writing in the aftermath of 9/11 generally fell into one of 
three groups: unilateralists, interventionists, and proceduralists. Unilateralists 
argued in favor of tilting the allocation of government power toward the 
executive because the state’s interest in survival is superior to any individual 
liberty interest, and because the executive is best able to understand and 
address threats to the state. Interventionists, by contrast, argued in favor 
of restraining the executive (principally through the judiciary) precisely 
to prevent the erosion of civil liberties. Proceduralists took a middle road, 
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informed by what they perceived as a central lesson of American history.1 
Because at least some overreaction by the state is an inevitable feature of a 
national crisis, the most one can reasonably hope for is to build in structural 
and procedural protections to preserve the essential U.S. constitutional 
framework, and, perhaps, to minimize the damage done to American legal 
and moral traditions.
Despite profound differences between and within these groups, legal 
scholars in all three camps (as well as litigants and clinicians, including the 
authors) shared a common perspective—viz., that repressive legal policies 
adopted by wartime governments are temporary departures from hypothesized 
peacetime norms. In this narrative, metaphors of bewilderment, wandering, 
and confusion predominate. The country “loses its bearings” and “goes 
astray.” Bad things happen until at last the nation “finds itself” or “comes to its 
senses,” recovers its “values,” and fixes the problem. Internment ends, habeas 
is restored, prisoners are pardoned, repression passes. In a show of regret, we 
change direction, “get back on course,” and vow it will never happen again. 
Until the next time, when it does. This view, popularized in treatments like All 
the Laws but One, by the late Chief Justice Rehnquist,2 or the more thoughtful 
1. This scholarly production should come as no surprise; a generation ago, Abe Sofaer 
similarly observed that “[t]he war in Indochina led to an enormous outpouring of legal 
activity.” Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power xiii (Ballinger Pub. Co. 
1976). One difference between then and now, however, has been the rise of clinical programs 
and academic centers dedicated to the study and litigation of these issues. Some law schools 
have opened clinics, such as the National Security Clinic at the University of Texas, Austin, 
to litigate rights abuses arising out of “counter-terrorism efforts both domestic and abroad.” 
One of the first clinics in this vein was the National Litigation Project of the Allard K. 
Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at Yale, founded in 2002, where Metcalf 
co-taught from 2005–2010; by the time this essay goes to print, Yale’s “9/11 Clinic” will have 
transitioned to a broader human rights litigation portfolio focused on detention and human 
rights in the United States. The majority of institutions, however, are “research centers” 
that aspire, in the words of Georgetown’s Center on National Security and the Law, “to 
change the dialogue from the current sloganeering debate into a mature conversation 
that can build long-term solutions to the problems posed by asymmetric warfare, rapid 
technological and transportation changes, and religious extremism.” http://www.law.
georgetown.edu/cnsl/. Similarly, the NYU Center on Law and Security describes itself as 
“a center of expertise committed to promoting an informed understanding of the legal and 
security issues defining the post-9/11 era,” see http://www.lawandsecurity.org/, and William 
and Mary’s Center for Human Security and the Law aims to “creat[e] citizen lawyers with 
an appreciation for national security issues through educating and exposing students to the 
interplay between national defense and the protection of civil rights.” http://law.wm.edu/
academics/intellectuallife/researchcenters/hrnsl/index.php. In fairness, the programs at 
several law schools long predated 9/11. The Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security at 
Duke, for instance, was founded in September, 1993 (http://www.law.duke.edu/lens/), and 
the Center for National Security Law at Virginia was established in April, 1981 (http://www.
virginia.edu/cnsl/).
2. William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime (Alfred A. Knopf 
1998). Notably, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s book was written in a time of relative peace and 
stability.
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and thorough discussion in Perilous Times by Chicago’s Geoffrey Stone,3 quickly 
became the dominant narrative in American society and the legal academy. 
This narrative also figured heavily in the many challenges to Bush-era policies, 
including by the authors. The narrative permitted litigators and legal scholars 
to draw upon what elsewhere has been referred to as America’s “civic religion”4 
and to cast the courts in the role of hero-judges5 whom we hoped would restore 
legal order.6
But by framing the Bush Administration’s response as the latest in a 
series of regrettable but temporary deviations from a hypothesized liberal 
norm, the legal academy ignored the more persistent, and decidedly illiberal, 
authoritarian tendency in American thought to demonize communal “others” 
during moments of perceived threat. Viewed in this light, what the dominant 
narrative identified as a brief departure caused by a military crisis is more 
accurately seen as part of a recurring process of intense stigmatization tied to 
periods of social upheaval, of which war and its accompanying repressions are 
simply representative (and particularly acute) illustrations. It is worth recalling, 
for instance, that the heyday of the Ku Klux Klan in this country, when the 
organization could claim upwards of 3 million members, was the early-1920s, 
and that the period of greatest Klan expansion began in the summer of 1920, 
almost immediately after the nation had “recovered” from the Red Scare of 
1919–20.7 Klan activity during this period, unlike its earlier and later iterations, 
3. Geoffrey Stone, In Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to 
the War on Terrorism (1st ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2004).
4. Joseph Margulies, Why the Hubbub About Habeas? A Post-Mortem on a Failed Policy, 35 
Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5089, 5101 (2009).
5. See Anthony Amsterdam, Thurgood Marshall’s Image of the Blue-Eyed Child in Brown, 
68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 226, 229 (1993) (noting that cases involving controversial issues “almost 
always call for telling an action story with the court as hero and the rectification of the wrong 
as the hero’s duty”).
6. Metcalf believes the people responsible for planning and implementing unlawful 
interrogation and detention regimes should not escape personal liability (in both a legal and 
moral sense). As a general matter, Margulies disagrees. But both believe that a strategy for 
post-9/11 justice that focuses exclusively on the law (and especially courts) misses the mark 
by failing to confront the political and societal conditions that foster the creation of abusive 
policies.
7. Consistent with the dominant narrative, legal scholars have largely ignored the economic, 
cultural and social links between the Red Scare and American nativism before, during, 
and after the Great War. Historians, however, have not. The classic study is John Higham, 
Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925 (Rutgers 1992), who 
provides the information cited in the text at 286–299; see also, e.g., David H. Bennett, The 
Party of Fear: the American Far Right from Nativism to the Militia Movement 183–237 
(Vintage 1995). The best discussion of the scientific racism that emerged in the early 20th 
century, and which gave an intellectual patina to the nativism of the same period, is Thomas 
F. Gossett, Race: The History of an Idea in America (Oxford Univ. Press 1965). For some 
of the many accounts of the excesses of the Red Scare, see, e.g., Stanley Cohen, A Study in 
Nativism: The American Red Scare of 1919–20, 79 Pol. Sci. Q. 52, 52 (1964); Robert K. 
Murray, Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1920 (Univ. of Minnesota 1955); 
Stone, supra note 3.
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focused mainly on the scourge of the immigrant Jew and Catholic, and flowed 
effortlessly from the anti-alien, anti-radical hysteria of the Red Scare. Yet this 
period is almost entirely unaccounted for in the dominant post-9/11 narrative 
of deviation and redemption, which in most versions glides seamlessly from 
the madness of the Red Scare to the internment of the Japanese during World 
War II.8
And because we were studying the elephant with the wrong end of the 
telescope, we came to a flawed understanding of the beast. In Part IV, we 
argue that the interventionists and unilateralists came to an incomplete 
understanding by focusing almost exclusively on what Stuart Scheingold 
called “the myth of rights”—the belief that if we can identify, elaborate, and 
secure judicial recognition of the legal “right,” political structures and policies 
will adapt their behavior to the requirements of the law and change will follow 
more or less automatically.9 Scholars struggled to define the relationship 
between law and security primarily through exploration of structural10 and 
procedural questions, and, to a lesser extent, to substantive rights. And they 
examined the almost limitless number of subsidiary questions clustered 
within these issues. Questions about the right to habeas review, for instance, 
generated a great deal of scholarship about the handful of World War II-era 
cases that the Bush Administration relied upon, including most prominently 
Johnson v. Eisentrager and Ex Parte Quirin.11
Regardless of political viewpoint, a common notion among most 
unilateralist and interventionist scholars was that when law legitimized or de-
legitimized a particular policy, this would have a direct and observable effect 
on actual behavior. The premise of this scholarship, in other words, was that 
8. Omissions like this can be readily multiplied. The dominant narrative, for instance, typically 
makes no mention of the long and virulent history of anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism in 
this country, ignores slavery, Jim Crow, and the treatment of Native Americans altogether, 
and refers briefly if at all to the nativism and anti-immigrant sentiment that has flourished 
episodically in this country since before the Founding. For detailed explorations, see 
Higham, supra note 7; Dan Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in America (Harvard 
Univ. Press 2007); David Cole, Enemy Aliens (The New Press 2006). It also leaves essentially 
undisturbed any consideration of U.S. actions abroad, including the role of the CIA in 
training and popularizing torture methods. See Alfred McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA 
Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on Terror (1st ed., Metropolitan Books 2006). 
Nor does it acknowledge the brutality that so characterizes the treatment of prisoners in the 
United States—especially prisoners of color or otherwise marginalized—through the present 
day. See generally John T. Parry, Understanding Torture: Law, Violence and Political Identity 
135 (Univ. of Michigan Press 2010); Brian Jarvis, Cruel and Unusual: Punishment and U.S. 
Culture (Pluto Press 2004).
9. Stuart Scheingold, The Politics of Rights 5 (2d ed., Univ. of Michigan Press 2004).
10. For our purposes, separation-of-powers arguments present similar shortcomings to the 
extent they assume that the policy in question would change if confronted with a judicial 
decree to the contrary.
11. A simple search of core U.S. law journals in Hein OnLine produced 296 articles that cited 
Johnson v. Eisentrager from 2001–2010 but only 198 in the half century after the Supreme 
Court decided the case in 1950. A search regarding Ex Parte Quirin yielded similar results.
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policies “struck down” by the courts, or credibly condemned as lawless by 
the academy, would inevitably be changed—and that this should be the focus 
of reform efforts. Even when disagreement existed about the substance of 
rights or even which branch should decide their parameters, it reflected shared 
acceptance of the primacy of law, often to the exclusion of underlying social or 
political dynamics. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, for instance, may have 
thought, unlike the great majority of their colleagues, that the torture memo 
was “standard fare.”12 But their position nonetheless accepted the notion that 
if the prisoners had a legal right to be treated otherwise, then the torture memo 
authorized illegal behavior and must be given no effect.13
Recent developments, however, cast doubt on two grounding ideas of 
interventionist and unilateralist scholarship—viz., that post-9/11 policies were 
best explained as responses to a national crisis (and therefore limited in time 
and scope), and that the problem was essentially legal (and therefore responsive 
to condemnation by the judiciary and legal academy). One might have 
reasonably predicted that in the wake of a string of Supreme Court decisions 
limiting executive power, apparently widespread and bipartisan support for 
the closure of Guantánamo during the 2008 presidential campaign, and the 
election of President Barack Obama, which itself heralded a series of executive 
orders that attempted to dismantle many Bush-era policies, the nation would 
be “returning” to a period of respect for individual rights and the rule of law. 
Yet the period following Obama’s election has been marked by an increasingly 
12. Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, A “Torture” Memo and Its Tortuous Critics, Wall St. J. July 
6, 2004, at A22. Posner and Vermeule argued that the memo was a defensible interpretation 
of the anti-torture statute: “But the memorandum’s arguments are standard lawyerly 
fare, routine stuff. The definition of torture is narrow simply because, the memorandum 
claims, the relevant statutory texts and their drafting histories themselves build in a series 
of narrowing limitations, including a requirement of ‘specific intent.’ The academic critics 
disagree, but there is no foul play here.” Id. The necessary implication of this reasoning is 
that if the memo had not been a faithful exegesis of the statutory text, its advice would have 
been legally unsound, and therefore should not have been followed.
13. Throughout this piece, we use “post-9/11 policies” and similar formulations to denote the set 
of policies enacted by the Bush Administration in response to the attacks of September 11. 
We do so with some trepidation, since, as should be apparent from our argument, we find 
the term itself to be problematic because it suggests a strict delineation between the world as 
it existed on Sept. 10, 2001, and Sept. 11, 2001. Nonetheless, the term is a familiar shorthand 
at the very least for a set of interrelated counterterrorism policies, including: the detention, 
interrogation, and rendition of alleged “enemy combatants”; the specialized procedures 
legislated by the Detainee Treatment and Military Commissions Acts; the use of warrantless 
wiretaps and government surveillance; and the increasing use of the State Secrets evidentiary 
privilege to restrict judicial inquiry into the legality of these various practices. See, e.g., Oren 
Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 
112 Yale L.J. 1011, 1017–18 (2003) (describing “alternate system of justice” enacted after 9/11). 
But the term can also refer to a much broader set of legal, political, and social developments 
involving the mistreatment of primarily Muslim, South Asian, Arab, and Middle Eastern 
people within the United States, from the round-up of non-citizens directly after 9/11 to the 
rash of hate crimes perpetrated on “Muslim-looking” people since 9/11. See, e.g., Muneer I. 
Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 
Cal. L. Rev. 1259, 1278 (2004).
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retributive and venomous narrative surrounding Islam and national security. 
Precisely when the dominant narrative would have predicted change and 
redemption, we have seen retreat and retrenchment.
This conundrum is not adequately addressed by dominant strands of 
post-9/11 legal scholarship. In retrospect, it is surprising that much post-9/11 
scholarship appears to have set aside critical lessons from previous decades 
as to the relationship among law, society and politics.14 Many scholars have 
long argued in other contexts that rights—or at least the experience of rights—are 
subject to political and social constraints, particularly for groups subject to 
historic marginalization. Rather than self-executing, rights are better viewed 
as contingent political resources, capable of mobilizing public sentiment and 
generating social expectations.15
From that view, a victory in Rasul or Boumediene no more guaranteed that 
prisoners at Guantánamo would enjoy the right to habeas corpus than a victory 
in Brown v. Board16 guaranteed that schools in the South would be desegregated.17 
Rasul and Boumediene, therefore, should be seen as part (and probably only a 
small part) of a varied and complex collection of events, including the fiasco 
in Iraq, the scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison, and the use of warrantless 
wiretaps, as well as seemingly unrelated episodes like the official response to 
Hurricane Katrina. These and other events during the Bush years merged to 
give rise to a powerful social narrative critiquing an administration committed 
to lawlessness, content with incompetence, and engaged in behavior that was 
contrary to perceived “American values.”18 Yet the very success of this narrative, 
14. In some instances the evolution was explicit. Jack Balkin, in a thoughtful essay on 
the blog Balkinization, considered the salience of Critical Legal Studies in light of 
Bush Administration policies. He concluded that “[in] a world of executive arrogance, 
authoritarian posturing, and blatant disregard for rule of law values…[c]ritical scholars 
should go back and read what feminists and critical race theorists had to say about the 
limited but nevertheless important values implicit in the rule of law and rights discourse.” 
Jack Balkin, The Other Side of Critical Legal Theory, May 3, 2007, available at http://balkin.
blogspot.com/2007/05/other-side-of-critical-legal-theory.html.
15. Scheingold, supra note 9, at 131–48. We do not mean to endorse wholeheartedly the Critical 
Legal Studies viewpoint nor to revive old debates. Even so, as others have recognized, the 
recent history of post-9/11 policy brings those theories once again to bear on understanding 
the interplay between law and society. See, e.g., Brian Tamanaha, The Bush Administration 
Vindicates Critical Legal Studies, May 3, 2007, available at http://balkin.blogspot.
com/2007/05/bush-administration-vindicates-critical.html (“An apology is due from the 
conservatives and moderates who excoriated CLSers at the time for cynicism about law. On 
this score, the Crits pale in comparison to the Bush Administration.”).
16. Brown v. Board of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and the Unfulfilled 
Hopes for Racial Reform (Oxford Univ. Press 2004). The cruel irony of that fact is made 
in Caprice L. Roberts, Rights, Remedies, and Habeas Corpus: The Uighurs, Legally Free 
While Actually Imprisoned, 24 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 1 (2009).
18. We use social narrative as “the discourse about good and bad states of society,” combining 
“utopian and polemical elements [that attempt] to impose models of what society should be 
on others.” S.C. Humphreys, Law as Discourse, 1 Hist. & Anthropology 241, 251 (1985). 
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culminating in the election of Barack Obama in 2008, produced quiescence 
on the Left, even as it stimulated massive opposition on the Right. The result 
has been the emergence of a counter-narrative about national security that has 
produced a vigorous social backlash such that most of the Bush-era policies 
will continue largely unchanged, at least for the foreseeable future.19
Just as we see a widening gap between judicial recognition of rights in the 
abstract and the observation of those rights as a matter of fact, there appears to 
be an emerging dominance of proceduralist approaches, which take as a given 
that rights dissolve under political pressure, and, thus, are best protected by 
basic procedural measures. But that stance falls short in its seeming readiness 
to trade away rights in the face of political tension. First, it accepts the tropes 
du jour surrounding radical Islam—namely, that it is a unique, and uniquely 
apocalyptic, threat to U.S. security. In this, proceduralists do not pay adequate 
heed to the lessons of American history and sociology. And second, it endorses 
too easily the idea that procedural and structural protections will protect 
against substantive injustice in the face of popular and/or political demands for 
an outcome-determinative system that cannot tolerate acquittals. Procedures 
only provide protection, however, if there is sufficient political support for the 
underlying right. Since the premise of the proceduralist scholarship is that 
such support does not exist, it is folly to expect the political branches to create 
meaningful and robust protections. In short, a witch hunt does not become 
less a mockery of justice when the accused is given the right to confront 
witnesses. And a separate system (especially when designed for demonized 
“others,” such as Muslims) cannot, by definition, be equal.
In the end, we urge a fuller embrace of what Scheingold called “the politics 
of rights,” which recognizes the contingent character of rights in American 
society. We agree with Mari Matsuda, who observed more than two decades 
ago that rights are a necessary but not sufficient resource for marginalized 
people with little political capital.20 To be effective, therefore, we must look 
beyond the courts and grapple with the hard work of long-term change with, 
through and, perhaps, in spite of law. These are by no means new dilemmas, 
but the post-9/11 context raises difficult and perplexing questions that deserve 
study and careful thought as our nation settles into what appears to be a 
permanent emergency.
II. An Emergency Scholarship
A review of the post-9/11 legal literature reveals a scholarship obsessed with 
the exceptional. In the years following 9/11, scholars referred to that period 
19. Scheingold, supra note 9, at xxxii–xxxvii (discussing recent scholarship on 
counter-mobilizations).
20. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323, 393–94 (1987).
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as “a violent crisis,”21 “extraordinary times,”22 a “national emergency,”23 and a 
“catastrophe.”24 Whereas in the years prior to 2001 “[d]iscussion of emergency 
powers in general, and counterterrorism measures in particular, [had] been 
relegated to a mere few pages, at most, in the leading American constitutional 
law texts,”25 the topic of national security produced a multitude of articles, 
books and other commentary.26
Despite the proliferation of post-9/11 legal scholarship, the discussion has 
taken place within a relatively narrow range. Starting with the proposition 
that 9/11 marked the beginning of a national military emergency, the vast 
majority of scholarship focused on the structural and procedural questions of 
how to manage that crisis. The debate was quickly framed as a battle among 
“unilateralists,” who pressed for expanded executive powers to best meet the 
new crisis and “interventionists,” who thought the crisis was best met by a 
rigid constitutional interpretation favoring individual rights and enforced by 
a muscular judiciary. As this debate took shape, a third group of scholars—the 
“proceduralists”—began to argue that some departure from peacetime norms 
was inevitable, but modest procedural interventions would properly ensure 
constitutional serenity.27 To try to summarize all scholarship regarding U.S. 
counterterrorism in the years 2001–2010 as a “debate” is of course greatly 
oversimplified.28 We do not mean to discount the creative and counter-
intuitive inquiries undertaken by many scholars, often across obvious lines 
21. Gross, supra note 13, at 1011.
22. Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary Times: Common Sense in Times of Crisis, 
87 B.U. L. Rev. 289 (2007).
23. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National 
Emergency (Oxford Univ. Press 2006); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 
Yale L.J. 1029 (2004) (advocating for a “National Emergencies Act.”).
24. Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response (1st ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
25. Gross, supra note 13, at 1012.
26. As of February 2010, a search for law review articles shows that more than 2,000 articles 
published since Sept. 11, 2001 contain the word “terror” or “terrorism” in the title, in contrast 
with 352 prior to that date.
27. These labels are borrowed, to some extent, from Oren Gross, who described the “Business as 
Usual” response to “acute national crises,” marked by “notions of constitutional absolutism 
and perfection.” Gross, supra note 13, at 1021. By contrast, “models of accommodation” 
attempt to preserve the regular system, but “exceptional adjustments are introduced to 
accommodate exigency.” Id. at 1022.
28. Aziz Huq characterizes scholarship regarding the role of courts in national security cases 
as falling into two broad camps, which we term “interventionists” and “unilateralists,” but 
further identifies five general schools of thought along that spectrum. Aziz Z. Huq, Against 
National Security Exceptionalism, 2010 Sup. Ct. Rev. (forthcoming 2010) (“Scholarly 
attention to the judicial role respecting national security has produced five accounts of the 
federal courts’ function: (i) the “social learning” thesis, (ii) heroic countermajoritarianism, 
(iii) the executive accommodation account, (iv) national security minimalism, and (v) 
bilateral institutional endorsement.”).
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between “conservative” and “progressive.” That said, certain common themes 
and—perhaps more important—omissions are apparent.
The Unilateralists
For scholars sympathetic to Bush-era policies, great American presidents 
stretching back to Abraham Lincoln had acted to protect the public during 
periods of national crisis, even if doing so demanded temporary departures 
from peacetime rights.29 Such departures were not only justified, they were 
part of the very fabric of our constitutional system.30 Cass Sunstein and Jack 
Goldsmith, for instance, posited that the military tribunals enacted by President 
Bush were on stronger ground than those used by Franklin Roosevelt.31
Generally speaking, these scholars argued for heightened deference to the 
executive as the branch best placed to make the necessary cost-benefit analysis 
in any presumed tradeoff between liberty and security.32 Adrian Vermuele and 
Eric Posner flatly stated that “[o]ur central claim is that government is better 
than courts or legislators at striking the correct balance between security and 
liberty during emergencies.”33 Richard Posner similarly called upon judges 
to “decid[e] cases narrowly, preferably on statutory grounds, hesitating to 
trundle out the heavy artillery of constitutional invalidation.”34
29. See, e.g., John Yoo, Lincoln’s Constitutionalism in Time of War: Lessons for the War on 
Terror?, 12 Chap. L. Rev. 505, 533 (2009) (“While some believe that the courts should 
still decide cases challenging government authority without taking account of wartime 
conditions, this approach ignores the costs of judicial intervention, not only to the war effort 
but also to the Court.”); Lawson, supra note 22, at 299–303 (defending expansive view of 
emergency powers on originalist grounds); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of 
Necessity, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1257 (2005) (drawing upon Lincoln to argue for “meta-
rule” of necessity in interpretation of separation of powers in times of crisis).
30. Lawson, supra note 22, at 299–303 (defending expansive view of emergency powers on 
originalist grounds); John C. Yoo, War and The Constitutional Text, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1639, 1654 (2002) (“[T]he Framers would have understood the President’s powers as 
commander-in-chief and chief executive as vesting him with the authority to initiate and 
conduct hostilities…. [T]he power to declare war would not have been understood by the 
Framers as a significant restriction on the President’s powers in war.”).
31. Jack Goldsmith & Cass Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference 
Sixty Years Makes, 19 Const. Comm. 261 (2002).
32. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 605, 626 
(2003) (criticizing “accounts of emergency that emphasize the Constitution’s role in limiting 
the impact of fear on government policy” and concluding that “strict enforcement of the 
Constitution during emergencies will not improve policy choices by restricting the influence 
of fear.”); John Yoo, War, Responsibility and the Age of Terrorism, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 793, 794 
(2004).
33. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the 
Courts 6, 15–18 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (outlining “deferential view” of executive power 
in emergencies, under which judges defer to executive in part because of executive’s 
informational advantage).
34. Posner, supra note 23, at 34; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
47, 50 (calling for “a minimalist approach to intrusions on freedom amidst war”).
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As Oren Gross observed, unilateralist proposals were founded upon “the 
belief in our ability to separate emergencies and crises from normalcy,” which 
“facilitates our acceptance of expansive governmental emergency powers 
and counterterrorism measures, for it reassures us that once the emergency 
is removed and terrorism is no longer a threat, such powers and measures 
will also be terminated and full return to normalcy ensured.”35 More to the 
point, the unilateralist stance—founded on the notion of the exceptional and 
the limited—“assures us that counter-emergency measures will not be directed 
against us, but only against those who pose a threat to the community.”36 
Those boundaries, however, proved difficult to specify. Starting with the 
fuzzy premise of a “war on terror,” unilateralist scholars shied away from strict 
temporal or territorial bounds, instead turning to status-based distinctions. 
Vermuele and Posner emphasized citizenship as a hallmark between “us” 
and “them,”37 whereas others borrowed (loosely) from laws-of-war definitions 
of “combatant” vs. “non-combatant.”38 Regardless of the nomenclature, in 
practice and in rhetoric, proposed policies applied to the newly racialized 
category of “Islamic extremist” in what Stephen Holmes has called the “re-
tribalization of culpability.”39
Interventionists
The unilateralist position sparked intense disagreement from libertarian 
scholars such as Lawrence Tribe and Patrick Gudridge, who stated that “[i]t 
was once an unspeakable thought that our Constitution should have lacunae—
temporal discontinuities within which nation-saving steps would be taken by 
those in power, blessed not by the nation’s founding document but by the 
brute necessities of survival.”40 Civil libertarians tried to reclaim U.S. history 
35. Gross, supra note 13, at 1022.
36. Id.
37. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure, 92 VA. L. Rev. 
1091, 1144 (2006) (arguing that Carolene Product’s “discrete and insular minority” is not 
acute during “emergencies” and, if anything, applies with less force to non-citizens).
38. For defenders of post-9/11 policies, “[t]he differentiation of lawful and unlawful combatants 
is not an exercise of revenge or animus, but the preservation of civilization.” Douglas 
W. Kmiec, Observing the Separation of Powers: The President’s War Power Necessarily 
Remains “The Power to Wage War Successfully,” 53 Drake L. Rev. 851, 891 (2005).
39. Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 
97 Cal. L. Rev. 301, 351 (2009). While defenders of post-9/11 policies generally avoid any 
discussion of race, the disproportionate effect of post-9/11 policies on groups deemed to 
be “Muslim-looking” is well-documented. See, e.g., Gil Gott, The Devil We Know: Racial 
Subordination and National Security Law, 50 Vill. L. Rev. 1073 (2005); Deborah A. Ramirez, 
Jennifer Hoopes & Tara Lai Quinlan, Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 
World, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1195 (2003).
40. Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick O. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L.J. 
1801 (2004). To a large degree, the pitched debate between Ackerman, Tribe and others 
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from conservatives, highlighting how Bush policies were inconsistent with 
past U.S. responses to internal threats and the long-standing judicial function 
in stemming executive excess.41 From that view, the World War II internee 
case of Endo was at least as important as its contemporary Korematsu, and the 
decades of Cold War precedents demonstrated a canny judicial approach to 
“ultimately largely dismantle Cold War security efforts.”42 To interventionist 
scholars, “the [Bush] Administration’s recent assertion of preclusive war 
powers is revealed as a radical attempt to remake the constitutional law of war 
powers.”43
The interventionists criticized those who would restrict individual liberties 
and judicial review on an emergency basis for advocating “constitutional 
amnesia,”44 and presented a sunnier view of the judicial role in wartime. They 
argued that federal courts presented the best (or perhaps the least worst) 
safeguard of individual rights.45 Some posited that courts generally (though 
perhaps belatedly) fulfilled their role to hem in executive excesses and to 
protect individual rights,46 while others thought that the courts’ lackluster track 
record demonstrated a need for a greater judicial role, especially in moments 
over the appropriate response rekindled past debates about constitutional process. See, e.g., 
Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 59 
Yale L.J. 1063 (1980).
41. For example, Carlton Larson riffed on Scalia’s dissent in the Yaser Hamdi habeas case and 
pointed to the many instances of treason being used against non-citizens, thereby calling into 
question the entire wartime paradigm. Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional 
Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 863, 926 (2006). 
History became a battleground in the courts as well. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, No. 03–334, Al 
Odah v. United States, 03–343, Brief of Fred Korematsu as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, Jan. 14, 2004.
42. Tribe & Gudridge, supra note 40, at 1844–45, 1851.
43. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A 
Constitutional History, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 692 (2008). The concern with preserving the 
rule of law—and especially the separation of powers—from an overzealous executive was 
another common theme among interventionist scholars. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Law’s 
Detour: Justice Displaced in the Bush Administration (NYU Press 2010).
44. Tribe & Gudridge, supra note 40, at 1804.
45. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Enemy Combatants and Separation of Powers, 1 J. Nat’l 
Security L. & Pol’y 73 (2005) (arguing that stronger separation of powers analysis would 
have led to different outcomes in Padilla and Hamdi); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional 
Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 699, 706 (2006). Indeed, Steve 
Vladeck has recently argued that the separation of powers thesis for access to courts at base 
of Boumediene may provide a means to resuscitate individual rights in other contexts. 
Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of 
Powers, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2107 (2009).
46. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The “Enemy Combatant” Cases in Historical Context: The 
Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1005, 1083 (2007); Patrick 
O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1933, 1968 n.160 (2003) (“But if it is the 
case, as I have argued, that constitutional law is ordinarily complex, a collection of emphases 
and therefore a range of variations, it becomes possible to recognize such complexity, and 
the attendant differences in focus and result, without proclaiming crisis.”).
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of crisis, to protect historically marginalized groups such as non-citizens.47 In 
any event, the civil libertarian instinct was to turn first and foremost to the 
courts.
For many in this camp, the post-9/11 era posed an uncomfortable dilemma. 
The urge to portray Bush policies as legally deviant required the evocation of 
a better, pre-9/11 United States, which implicitly minimized decades of legal 
battles—against police brutality, the death penalty, religious intolerance, racial 
profiling, and even emergency powers,48 to name but a few.49 Put another 
way, were post-9/11 policies sui generis (and therefore outside U.S. norms), 
or did they represent an extreme but continuous path with the past? Most—
including the authors—chose the former in what Jack Balkin termed “a world 
of executive arrogance, authoritarian posturing, and blatant disregard for rule 
of law values.”50 Under such circumstances, taking refuge in the language of 
rights and in the purview of courts seemed the best, and perhaps only, hope.
Proceduralists
Another set of scholars—whom we call “proceduralists”51—positioned 
themselves as centrist pragmatists concerned principally with the overall well-
being of U.S. constitutional institutions. If unilateralists were too prone to 
disregard individual rights,52 the civil libertarians were too “rigid[] in the face 
47. Burt Neuborne, The Role of Courts in Time of War, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 555, 
567–68 (2005); Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making, 
2005 Wis. L. Rev. 115 (2005) (arguing that history of anti-communist prosecutions in 1940s and 
1950s demonstrate need for greater judicial independence on matters of national security); 
Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 Mo. L. Rev. 903, 909–21 (2004) (discussing 
public and government responses to perceived threats during World War I, World War 
II, and the Cold War); David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and 
Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2565, 2576–77 (2003) (arguing for 
expanded judicial review in times of emergency because of the risk that minorities will be 
scapegoated).
48. The question of appropriate modes of governance during periods of crisis, of course, long 
predates 2001. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 Yale 
L.J. 1385 (1989).
49. For example, John Parry describes how U.S. law had already accommodated brutal 
interrogation and dehumanizing incarceration practices before September 11. Parry, supra 
note 8, at 159.
50. Balkin, supra note 14.
51. Cass Sunstein has referred to his position as “Minimalist” caught between “National 
Security Maximalist” and “Liberty Maximalists.” Cass Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 47¸71 (2004).
52. Sunstein, supra note 51, at 73–74 (arguing that policies advocated by “National Security 
Maximalists” could result in undue infringements on liberty, especially because “when 
deprivations of liberty are limited to an identifiable few—as they frequently are—external 
checks on the executive provide an insufficient safeguard of civil liberties.”).
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of radical changes in the surrounding context.”53 The answer between those 
proposed extremes lay in constitutional process and modest judicial review.
Proceduralists viewed emergency overreactions as both regrettable and 
inevitable.54 “Times of heightened risk to the physical safety of their citizens,” 
wrote Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, “inevitably cause democracies 
to recalibrate their institutions and processes and to reinterpret existing legal 
norms, with greater emphasis on security, and less on individual liberty, than 
in “normal” times.”55 What mattered most was not the prevention of individual 
abuses, but the preservation of the larger constitutional order.56 For scholars 
such as Pildes and Isaacharof, the courts were rightly concerned first and 
foremost with structural and procedural questions, rather than individual 
liberties. From that view, “[i]f the framework for judicial determinations is 
shifted from individual rights to processes of institutional decision making, the 
American experience offers some rather surprisingly stable observations about 
legal constraints in times of national emergency.”57 Although process-driven 
inquiries might be frustratingly incomplete for civil libertarians, courts properly 
emphasized “second-order issues of appropriate institutions and processes, 
through which [they] seek mainly to ensure that the right institutional process 
supports the tradeoff between liberty and security at issue.”58 Cass Sunstein 
agreed, proposing an even more modest judicial role. For him, the Supreme 
Court correctly adopted a minimalism that required only the barest of due 
process for individuals and Congressional authorization, confining itself to 
“decisions that are themselves shallow and narrow and that therefore impose 
modest constraints on the future.”59
53. Gross, supra note 13, at 1021; Sunstein, supra note 51 (referring to a strict libertarian position 
as a “non-starter”).
54. Sanford Levinson has long written about the apparent disregard for the rule of law by our 
most celebrated presidents, including George Washington, Lincoln, and Roosevelt. Sanford 
Levinson, Constitutional Faith 9–17 (Princeton Univ. Press 1988).
55. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive 
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 Theoretical 
Inquiries L. 1, 2 (2004).
56. Ironically, many counterterrorism experts argue with considerable force that the “war on 
terror” is doomed to fail because terrorism is inevitable and predictable; the most one can 
reasonably hope for is containment. See, e.g., Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: 
Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat 204 (Random House 2006) (“Rather 
than having the objective of the defeat of terrorism, today our goal should be to contain the 
threat from terrorists. Unlike the goal of eliminating terrorism, the goal of containing the 
terrorist threat is achievable.”).
57. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 55, at 8; see also Lee Epstein, Daniel E. Ho, Gary King & 
Jeffrey A. Segal, The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War Cases, 
80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 74 (2005) (suggesting Court, in wartime, tends to engage “in a process-
oriented mode of decisionmaking…ensuring authorization from the democratic branches of 
government” in order to “ensure[ ] the political legitimacy of a ruling”).
58. Id. at 44.
59. Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 52.
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For some scholars in this camp, the primary purpose of law was not to 
eliminate but to contain the inevitable abuses attendant to national crises. The 
great fear was that “[t]he temporary will be made permanent, threatening civil 
liberties well beyond the period of the emergency.”60 Thus, Bruce Ackerman 
advocated for “an emergency constitution” that would temporarily take hold 
until the risk of constitutional fracture had passed.61 Under that framework, by 
using an “on/off” switch, any curtailment of individual rights was temporary, 
and the risk of contagion minimized. The rules would be set ahead of time, 
presumably when the nation was freer to favor civil liberties without the 
immediate crush of mass panic. For others, the best means to avoid long-
term erosion of liberties was to operate outside the “law.” Oren Gross argued 
“that there may be circumstances where the appropriate method of tackling 
grave dangers and threats entails going outside the constitutional order, at 
times even violating otherwise accepted constitutional principles, rules, and 
norms.”62 According to Gross, “extra-legal measures” may be normatively 
defensible (for example, in the ticking time-bomb scenario), but they are never 
legal. Thus, the legal order is protected from the infection of crisis-thinking 
and the adage that “hard cases make bad law.”63
By that measure, the post-9/11 jurisprudence was reassuring. Joseph 
Landau’s view of the courts’ response was typical: “[W]hile courts have 
yielded to the political branches in order to accommodate new challenges and 
a perceived emergency, they…have reinforced their critical role in the broader 
tripartite framework [] by grounding decision-making within their own area 
of expertise.”64 Incremental and marginal change through judicial review is 
best-suited to protect the constitutional order. Richard Fallon concurred that 
“[t]he [e]xecutive may be, and may be perceived as, better positioned than 
the judiciary to strike an informed balance between claims of liberty and the 
demands of national security.”65 Although the Supreme Court had generally 
failed to protect individual rights, Fallon posited that an emphasis on process 
served as a placeholder, such that “the Court has [] guaranteed itself future 
60. Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 
Wis. L. Rev. 273, 304 (2003).
61. Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L.J. 1029 (2004).
62. Gross, supra note 13, at 1023; Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis (1st 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
63. Mark Tushnet argues in a similar vein that to the extent emergency powers are necessary or 
inevitable; they should be viewed as “extra-constitutional.” Tushnet, supra note 60, at 306–07.
64. Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention 
Cases, 84 Wash. L. Rev. 661 (2009) (“Although the prevailing descriptive and normative 
frameworks advocate either blind deference to the collective expertise of the political 
branches or judicial resolution of large, complex and highly fractious substantive questions, 
courts have instead put procedure to muscular uses—focusing on the means of coordinate 
branch decision-making, while still allowing the political branches to define the content of 
the substantive law.”).
65. Richard Fallon, The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on 
Law and Political Science, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 352, 392 (2010).
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opportunities to consider what rights executive detainees have in a climate 
different from that which existed in the months and years immediately after 
9/11.”66
A small but vocal chorus of interventionists disagreed. In response to 
Hamdi,67 Owen Fiss “fault[ed]” the Supreme Court for having decided on 
purely procedural grounds,68 and, despite Hamdan’s69 reputation as a landmark 
decision on “military tribunals,”70 Mark Tushnet observed that “Hamdan 
changed the political dynamics associated with the law of emergency powers 
without changing the legal terrain (as conventionally understood) one whit.”71 
Likewise, while many lauded the Supreme Court’s extension of constitutional 
habeas to Guantánamo in Boumediene,72 others criticized the decision for leaving 
open a rash of both procedural and substantive questions, most notably the 
bounds of who may be detained and for how long.73 Jenny Martinez observed, 
66. Id. (“[E]ven though the Court’s jurisdictional rulings have not entailed the recognition of 
substantive rights, they have had the effect—which was almost surely intended—of unsettling 
the status quo ante by giving notice to the [e]xecutive [b]ranch that its detention policies are 
not immune from judicial scrutiny.”). Others, like Joseph Landau go further, arguing even 
that “[i]t would not be a stretch [] to argue that many of the detainees—if they could choose—
might be better off with a procedural resolution than a decision of substance.” Landau, supra 
note 64, at 675.
67. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (upholding military detention for U.S. citizen 
captured as “enemy combatant” in Afghanistan but imposing basic due process protections).
68. Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 235, 
235 (2006).
69. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that military commissions exceeded 
executive authority).
70. Walter Dellinger, The Most Important Decision on Presidential Power. Ever., Slate, June 
29, 2006, available at http://www.slate.com/ id/2144476/entry/2144825.
71. Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Some Lessons from 
Hamdan, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1451, 1451 (2007). Hence, Omar Khadr pled guilty in the 
military commission system, reportedly in exchange for a deal under which he would 
serve one additional year at Guantanamo and the remainder of his sentence in Canada. 
Paul Koring, Khadr pleads guilty in exchange for repatriation to Canada, Globe & Mail 
(Oct. 25, 2010), available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/americas/
omar-khadr-pleads-guilty-to-all-terrorism-charges/article1771325/.
72. Ronald Dworkin, Why It Was a Great Victory, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Aug. 14, 2008, at 18 
(describing Boumediene “one of the most important Supreme Court decisions in recent 
years” and “a landmark change in our constitutional practice”); Gerald L. Neuman, The 
Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 259, 260–61 
(2009) (“[F]or the first time in history the Court found it necessary to strike down a statute 
as violating the Suspension Clause, rather than construe it to avoid invalidity.”); Baher 
Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 Iowa 
L. Rev. 445, 446 (2010) (arguing that in Boumediene “the Court went significantly further 
than it had ever gone before.”).
73. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1013 
(2008); see also Neal Devins, Talk Loudly and Carry a Small Stick: The Supreme Court 
and Enemy Combatants, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 491, 492 (2010) (“One year later, the 
landmark billing of these rulings seems suspect. Next-to-no detainees had been released 
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“whatever its systemic virtues, the focus on process rather than substance 
comes at a human cost.”74 Moreover, Martinez was concerned that procedural 
decisions intended to serve only as placeholders nonetheless tilt the Court in a 
particular direction: “Having invited Congress to fix things, for example, the 
Court has put itself in an institutionally weaker position to later strike down 
Congress’s fix on rights-based grounds…. And the Court has done so without 
the benefit of fully considering the substantive or rights-based arguments.”75
For some scholars, no options were satisfactory. Mark Tushnet commented 
that neither Congress nor the judiciary has proven to be a champion of 
individual rights in the face of national security: “the difference between the 
residual role given individual rights in the separation-of-powers mechanism 
and its seemingly prominent role in the judicial-review mechanism nearly 
disappears.”76 Because of the president’s “prime mover” status in wartime 
decision-making, Tushnet dismissed “deference to the political branches” 
as “executive unilateralism in a new guise.”77 Throwing up his hands at the 
inadequate institutions to promote rigorous national defense while preserving 
individual liberties, Tushnet concluded “[p]erhaps we should consider the 
possibility that the existing Constitution is one of the dogmas of the quiet 
past.”78
*     *     *
Despite genuine and deep disagreements, the leading narrative in post-9/11 
legal scholarship was that a crisis had been thrust upon the United States, and, 
thus, the pressing question of the day was not whether the government should 
change, but how much.79 As Stephen Holmes recently observed, the dominant 
from Guantánamo.”). Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2293 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“So who has won? Not the detainees. The Court’s analysis leaves them with 
only the prospect of further litigation to determine the content of their new habeas right, 
followed by further litigation to resolve their particular cases, followed by further litigation 
before the D.C. Circuit….”). Eve Brensike Primus points to similar criticisms in the case 
of habeas review of state criminal convictions. Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of 
Habeas Corpus, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2010).
74. Martinez, supra note 73.
75. Id. at 1030. This critique echoes similar themes raised in the context of welfare rights. Charles 
A. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 56 Brook. L. Rev. 
731, 732–33 (1990) (“Judged by the experience of twenty years, the moderate, due process, 
cost-benefit approach to individual security [taken in Goldberg v. Kelly] must surely be 
deemed a failure. We have given it a fair trial, and it does not work…. If individual protection 
is our goal, nothing less than a full constitutional guarantee will do.”).
76. Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 
2673, 2679–80 (2005).
77. Id. at 2679-80.
78. Id. at 2682. 
79. Others have criticized the “exceptionalist” framework that characterizes much post-9/11 
scholarship. For example, Aziz Huq argues that “there is nothing sui generis about the 
behavior of courts in instances of national security exigency, or at least that the thesis of 
exceptionalism is overstated.” Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 
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framings presupposed that 9/11 heralded a radical departure from the norm, for 
which some reorganization of the national government and some re-calibration 
of the balance between liberty and security was both necessary and justified.80 
As with the Supreme Court, the academy’s largely procedural approach has 
arguably had a channeling effect.81 An emerging trend of scholarship, which 
takes the question of the tradeoff between rights and security seriously, urges 
a perhaps limited, but permanent, recalibration. We find ourselves, as Sanford 
Levinson predicted, in a “permanent emergency.”82
More fundamentally, an unstated but shared presumption among 
unilateralists and interventionists was the idea that courts were on the front line 
of the struggle to define the contours of post-9/11 policies, and that as a result, 
courts were the proper focus for scrutiny. The preponderance of post-9/11 
scholarship addressed whether unilateral executive action was permissible83 
and whether and to what extent judicial review was appropriate. As we show 
in the next section, that focus left many—but especially interventionists—
2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 225 (2009). See also Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the 
Federal Courts, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 579 (2010).
80. Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 
97 Calif. L. Rev. 301, 316 (2009) (“Civil libertarians seem insufficiently aware of how much, 
when they casually embrace the tradeoff metaphor, they are implicitly conceding to their 
conservative adversaries.”). Holmes has described the effect of the emergency framework, 
which he calls the “security vs. freedom” metaphor. “So powerful is the imaginative grip 
of this metaphor…that even civil libertarians adamantly opposed to extralegal executive 
discretion during emergencies implicitly accept it.” Id. at 313.
81. Parry, supra note 8, at 203–04.
82. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 Ga. L. 
Rev. 699 (2006). Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. has suggested that Boumediene may well prove to be 
a high water mark. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: 
Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic?, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1975, 
1979–80 (2009) (arguing that Boumediene was partially due to the Bush Administration’s 
political unpopularity; predicting that the Court’s review of similar future acts by another 
administration will be more deferential).
83. Some authors gestured toward fundamental rights that would withstand Congressional 
action, but largely left the boundaries undelineated. Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. 
Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 Yale L.J. 1259, 1309 
(2002) (arguing that “[w]hether or not Congress enacts such legislation, by extending 
to all “persons” within the Constitution’s reach such guarantees as equal protection and 
due process of law, the Constitution constrains how our government may conduct itself 
in bringing terrorists to justice.”). There are, of course, notable exceptions, including Kim 
Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 
9/11, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1001 (2004); John T. Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, Coercive 
Interrogation and Civil Rights Litigation After Chavez v. Martinez, 39 Ga. L. Rev. 733 
(2005); Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints 
on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 278, 325 (2003). An especially rich 
literature has arisen regarding the rights of terrorism suspects under international law. See, 
e.g., Meg Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of 
Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1333 (2007).
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unprepared for the new politics of the Obama era, when there appears to be 
a widening gap between “rights” as expressed by the Supreme Court and as 
experienced by individuals.
III. The Paradox of the Obama Era
If there were ever a moment when it appeared the dominant legal narrative 
had succeeded, and that the myth of rights was not a myth after all, it was 
Jan. 22, 2009. Democrats had won the largest electoral landslide since LBJ’s 
victory over Barry Goldwater in 1964, leaving them in control of the House, 
Senate, and White House, and once again prompting pundits to predict the 
imminent demise of the GOP.84 Obama had run on a promise to end the 
abuses of the Bush Administration’s “war on terror,” vowing to end torture, 
reform rendition, restrict the use of the State Secrets privilege, and restore 
the dominant role of Article III courts as the preferred venue for terrorism 
prosecutions. And of course, he promised to close the detention facility at 
Guantánamo.85 Unlike in the 2004 election, Republican attempts to capitalize 
on the politics of fear proved unsuccessful.
For several years leading up to the election, Obama’s proposed reforms 
appeared to be supported by a broad consensus. Journalists and media 
personalities had denounced nearly every aspect of the “war on terror,” including 
detention without legal process, the suspension of habeas corpus, the use of 
coercive or “enhanced” interrogation techniques, warrantless wiretapping, 
84. Michael Grunwald, One Year Ago: The Republicans in Distress, Time, May 9, 2009, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1896588,00.html (“These days, 
Republicans have the desperate aura of an endangered species.”). These predictions started 
even before the election. See, e.g., Joe Rothstein, Can The Republican Party Survive The 
2008 Elections?, U.S. Politics Today, Oct. 8, 2008, available at http://uspolitics.einnews.com/
article/557738-can-the-republican-party-survive-the-2008-elections- (predicting possible 
GOP “decline into permanent minority status”). More sensibly, David Brooks predicted 
the Republican Party would “veer right in the years ahead, and suffer more defeats,” before 
reforming itself along more moderate lines. David Brooks, Darkness at Dusk, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 20, 2008, at A29.
85. See, e.g., Barack Obama: The War We Need to Win, Obama ’08, available at http://www.
barackobama.com/pdf/CounterterrorismFactSheet.pdf (“Guantánamo has become a 
recruiting tool for our enemies. The legal framework behind Guantánamo has failed 
completely, resulting in only one conviction. President Bush’s own Secretary of Defense, 
Robert Gates, wants to close it. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell, wants to close it. 
The first step to reclaiming America’s standing in the world has to be closing this facility. 
As president, Barack Obama will close the detention facility at Guantánamo. He will reject 
the Military Commissions Act, which allowed the U.S. to circumvent Geneva Conventions 
in the handling of detainees. He will develop a fair and thorough process based on the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice to distinguish between those prisoners who should be 
prosecuted for their crimes, those who can’t be prosecuted but who can be held in a manner 
consistent with the laws of war, and those who should be released or transferred to their 
home countries.”); Obama: We Are Going To Close Gitmo, CBS News, Jan. 11, 2009, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/11/national/main4713038.shtml (“But I don’t 
want to be ambiguous about this. We are going to close Guantánamo and we are going to 
make sure that the procedures we set up are ones that abide by our Constitution.”).
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and the excessive use of presidential signing statements.86 Bookshelves 
groaned under the weight of titles that criticized nearly every aspect of the 
post-9/11 policy, and Jane Mayer’s book on the detention policy, The Dark 
Side, a New York Times bestseller, had been shortlisted for the National Book 
Award.87 Non-governmental organizations rained down a relentless criticism. 
Libertarian and conservative think tanks like CATO and the Rutherford 
Institute, bi-partisan organizations like the Constitution Project, a veritable 
army of liberal policy centers, and a broad coalition of religious and military 
groups consistently inveighed against the Bush Administration’s post-9/11 
policies.88 Professional associations like the American Bar Association and 
the American Psychological Association took official positions against one or 
more aspects of the post-9/11 world. And, of course, condemnation abroad was 
nearly universal.89
86. Much of this coverage was presented in Joseph Margulies, Guantánamo and the Abuse 
of Presidential Power (Simon and Schuster 2006). See also, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross 
Criticizes Indefinite Detention in Guantánamo Bay, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 2003, at A1; 
Edward T. Pound, A House of Horrors, Revealed, U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 6, 
2004, at 45; Gabor Rona, “War” Doesn’t Justify Guantánamo, Fin. Times, Mar. 1, 2004, 
available at http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=gabor+rona&y=15&x=33&id=040229002
897&ct=0&nclick_check=1; Jeffrey Toobin, Killing Habeas Corpus, The New Yorker, Dec. 
4, 2006, at 46; Evan Thomas, The Debate Over Torture: Right after 9/11, Cheney said, “we 
have to work…the dark side if you will,” Newsweek, Nov. 21, 2005, at 30; Marty Lederman, 
The Anti-Torture Memos: Balkinization Posts on Torture, Interrogation, Detention, War 
Powers, Executive Authority, DOJ and OLC, July 8, 2007, available at http://balkin.blogspot.
com/2005/09/anti-torture-memos-balkinization-posts.html.
87. Deborah P. Jacobs, Down a Dark Road, The Boston Globe, Dec. 9, 2008, at G3.
88. See, e.g., James Bovard, Breaking Bush’s Resistance: A pending court case could expose 
the administration’s torture regime, The American Conservative, July 30, 2007, available at 
http://www.amconmag.com/article/2007/jul/30/00025; Tim Wheeler, Growing movement 
assails Bush torture policy, People’s Weekly World Newspaper, May 18, 2006, available at 
http://www.pww.org/article/articleview/9149/; American Civil Liberties Union, Coalition 
Letter Supporting End to Torture and Changes in Interrogation and Detention Policy, 
Jan. 14, 2009, available at http://www.aclu.org/images/torture/asset_upload_file718_38484.
pdf; Amnesty International, Framework: End Illegal US Detentions (2007), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/167/2007/en/69dcf709-aa4b-11dc-a783-
95b6ae9ecbe6/amr511672007eng.pdf; Gene Healy & Timothy Lynch, CATO Institute, 
Power Surge: The Constitutional Record of George W. Bush (2006), available at http://www.
cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/powersurge_healy_lynch.pdf; Robert E. Hunter & William H. 
Taft, IV, U.S. Should Restore Rights to Detainees, The Constitution Project, July 10, 2007, 
available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Hunter_Taft_Commentary_Restore_
Rights_For_Detainees1.pdf; Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations, Civil 
Liberties: 2004 Statement of Conscience, available at http://www.uua.org/socialjustice/
socialjustice/statements/13422.shtml; John W. Whitehead, The Constitution is the Issue, 
The Rutherford Institute, Sept. 12, 2008, available at http://www.rutherford.org/articles_db/
commentary.asp?record_id=552.
89. See, e.g., Thomas Friedman, Just Shut it Down, N.Y. Times, May 27, 2005, at A23; Luke 
Harding, CIA’s secret jails open up new transatlantic rift: Hundreds of flights landed in 
Germany over two years: Seizure of innocent people likely to embarrass Rice, The Guardian, 
Dec. 5, 2005, at 14; Close Guantánamo Camp, Hain Says, BBC News, Feb. 17, 2006, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4722408.stm; (Euro MPs Urge 
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Nor was this reaction confined to popular culture. At a gathering at the 
University of Georgia in March, 2008, five former Secretaries of State—Henry 
Kissinger, James Baker, Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright, and Colin 
Powell—agreed the next president should move quickly to close the prison. 
Baker, who served under the first President Bush, said Guantánamo “gives us a 
very, very bad name, not just internationally.” “I have a great deal of difficulty,” 
he added, “understanding how we can hold someone, pick someone up,… 
and hold them without ever giving them an opportunity to appear before 
a magistrate.” Powell hoped the new president would close Guantánamo 
“immediately.”90 In the months before the 2008 election, several of the most 
senior members of the Bush White House announced that Guantánamo 
should be closed, including Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates. Even President Bush said he wanted to shutter 
the island prison. Congress, though it joined the fracas late, was eventually 
unsparing in its criticism.91 Promises by Senators McCain and Obama to close 
the camp provoked no particular public outcry.92
On Jan. 22, 2009, President Obama began to act on this apparent cultural 
consensus. To begin with, he ordered Guantánamo shut within a year. Noting 
the “significant concerns” raised by the facility, “both within the United States 
and internationally,” Obama determined it “would further the national security 
and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice” 
to close the base. He also directed the CIA to close and not reopen its black 
sites, and ordered CIA interrogators to confine themselves to the techniques 
authorized in the Army Field Manual, rather than the “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” authorized by the Bush Administration.93 In addition, he quickly 
brought into his administration a number of the academics, policy experts, 
and practitioners who had attacked various aspects of the war on terror.94 Polls 
Guantánamo Closure, BBC News, June 13, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/5074216.stm; Merkel: Guantánamo Mustn’t Exist in Long Term, Spiegel Online, 
Jan. 9, 2006, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,394180,00.html.
90. David E. Sanger, Restoring a Constitutional Balance, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2006, at A15. 
91. See, e.g., 152 Cong. Rec. S6047 (2006) (statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman); 152 Cong. Rec. 
S7290-04 (2006) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin); 153 Cong. Rec. E979-05 (2007) (speech 
of Rep. Jane Harman); 153 Cong. Rec. H7080–05 (2007) (statement of Rep. Moran); 155 
Cong. Rec. S779 (2009) (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd); Renee Schoof, Congress 
Letter to Bush: Close Guantánamo, McClatchy Newspapers, June 29, 2007, available at 
http://mcclatchydc.com/100/story/17486.html.
92. The views of Sens. John McCain and Obama were hardly unique; with the exception of 
former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney, every major candidate during the primaries had 
endorsed closing Guantánamo.
93. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 C.F.R 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009); Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 C.F.R 
4893 (Jan. 22, 2009); see also Australia Says It May Accept Guantánamo Bay Detainees, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 2008, at A7; James Risen, The Executive Power Awaiting the Next 
President, N.Y. Times, June 22, 2008, at A4.
94. Some of the more prominent include Harold Koh and Sarah Cleveland, respectively the 
Legal Advisor and Counselor on International Law at the Department of State; Marty 
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suggest these steps were broadly accepted. When they voted in November, 
only 12 percent of Americans identified the threat of terrorism as their number 
one concern, and by the end of 2008, a majority of Americans favored closing 
Guantánamo, ending torture, and either putting terror suspects on trial in 
federal court or returning them for prosecution in their home countries.95 
At least in January, 2009, it appeared as though the dominant narrative of 
deviation and redemption was true, and that the clamor for “rights” had been 
heard.
Yet by early 2010, even Obama’s supporters viewed many of his actions 
as stunning political missteps. What appeared to have been a broad cultural 
consensus had disappeared, and a new one  had supposedly emerged in its 
place. As though the former consensus never existed, politicians and pollsters 
confidently claimed to know what Americans really wanted, which is that 
Guantánamo remain open, “enhanced interrogation” remain on the table, 
preventive detention be added to the arsenal of U.S. counter-terror weapons, 
and that prosecutions, if they must occur, take place in military commissions 
rather than federal court. And politicians who previously supported reform 
scrambled to conjure creative explanations for their former positions. On 
January 22, 2009, for instance, John McCain, praised President Obama and 
pledged “to support [his] decision to close the prison at Guantánamo….”96 
Within months, however, when the political winds had changed, he was 
arguing that Guantánamo should stay open until a “comprehensive plan” 
has been passed by Congress.97 McCain and Connecticut Democrat-turned-
Lederman, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in Office of Legal Counsel, Department of 
Justice; Neal Katyal, Deputy Solicitor General; and Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, 
Department of Justice. There was, of course, the idiocy over the role played by some of these 
lawyers within the Department of Justice. See, e.g., Ari Shapiro, “Al-Qaeda 7” Controversy: 
Detainees and Politics, National Public Radio, March 11, 2010, available at http://www.npr.
org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124546087; Andrew McCarthy, Why the Al Qaeda 
7 Matter, National Review Online, Mar. 9, 2010, available at http://article.nationalreview.
com/427318/why-the-al-qaeda-seven-matter/andrew-c-mccarthy.
95. As Paul Gronke and Darius Rejali have recently shown, a majority of Americans have 
consistently opposed the use of torture, including in 2008. See Paul Gronke, et al., U.S. Public 
Opinion on Torture, 2001–2009, 43 Pol. Sci. & Pol. 3, 437–444 (2010). On public support for 
closing Guantánamo and use of trials in the civilian system, see, e.g., Jon Cohen & Jennifer 
Agiesta, Public Supports Closing Guantánamo; In Poll, Most Agree with President’s Plan 
to Shutter the Facility within a Year, Washington Post, Jan. 22, 2009, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/21/AR2009012103652.html; 
Jon Cohen, WaPo-ABC poll on Gitmo, Washington Post (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/postpoll011709.html.
96. See Joint Statement by Sen. McCain and Sen. Bob Graham on Guantánamo Executive Order, 
Jan. 22, 2009, available at http://mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.
PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=03BF6495-9452-AE33-F5EC-73E0E412F857.
97. See Floor Statement by Sen. McCain on the Closure of the Guantánamo Bay 
Prison, May 19, 2009, available at http://mccain.senate.gov/public/index.
cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.FloorStatements&ContentRecord_id=5B05F68A-FCB8-
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Independent Joseph Lieberman have proposed legislation that would permit 
detention without trial of citizens and non-citizens alike, including those 
arrested in this country, “for the duration of hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners” or for as long as authorized by either the law of 
war or by “any authorization for the use of military force provided by Congress 
pertaining to such hostilities.”98
Apparently dramatic reversals like this cry out for an explanation. The 
obvious candidate—some intervening event that reset the emergency clock—can 
be quickly set aside; no such event took place. In fact, the official consensus of 
the intelligence community is that Al Qaeda has been substantially weakened. 
In the national security assessment of 2009, Dennis Blair, the former Director 
of National Intelligence for the Obama Administration, reported that the 
threat of terrorism is no longer the greatest risk facing the United States, a 
position he repeated in 2010.99 If anything, the reality of events would suggest 
that support for emergency measures should continue to decline. The most 
significant incident of 2009—the failed attempt Christmas Day by Abdul Farouk 
Abdulmutallab to bring down a commercial jet by detonating explosives sewn 
into his clothing—cannot account for the reversal. By that time, the apparent 
consensus of 2008 had already evaporated, as demonstrated conclusively by 
the reaction to Abdulmutallab’s actions. When the Obama Administration 
arrested and charged him in federal court in Detroit, the partisan outcry was 
immediate and vitriolic. Even though Abdulmutallab confessed, pundits and 
politicians demanded to know why he had been brought into the criminal 
justice system, read his Miranda warnings, and prosecuted like a common 
criminal; polls quickly suggested substantial support for the use of “enhanced 
interrogation techniques,” including water-boarding, as well as trial by 
0CC5-F0E3-38840F8439E2; Press Release, Statement by Senator John McCain, Dec. 15, 
2009, available at http://mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.
PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=9461EB86-018E-E04C-D381-C90463777A8D.
98. S. 3081, 111th Cong. § 2d (2010). Enemy Belligerent Interrogation, Detention, and 
Prosecution Act of 2010. Preventive detention is provided for in Section 5, “Detention 
Without Trial of Unprivileged Enemy Belligerents.”
99. In the 2009 National Threat Assessment, Blair described the global economic freefall as 
the greatest threat to national security, and that “[b]ecause of the pressure we and our allies 
have put on al-Qa’ida’s core leadership in Pakistan and the continued decline of al-Qa’ida’s 
most prominent regional affiliate in Iraq, al-Qa’ida today is less capable and effective than 
it was a year ago.” See Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment, Given to the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February, 2009 available at http://www.dni.gov/
testimonies/20090212_testimony.pdf (“The primary near-term security concern of the United 
States is the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications.”). The assessment 
in 2010, given shortly after the failed Christmas attack, was considerably less sanguine. 
Still, Blair ranked cyber attacks as the number one threat to national security, followed by 
continued instability in the global economy, and did not retreat from his 2009 position that 
the United States was “turning a corner on violent extremism.” See Intelligence Community 
Annual Threat Assessment, given to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February, 
2010, available at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf.
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military commission.100 Yet barely 100 days after 9/11, the Bush Administration 
reacted precisely the same way to shoe-bomber Richard Reid, who was duly 
convicted and sentenced to life in prison. At the time, not even conservative 
commentators had argued for a different result.101
IV. A Politics of Crisis and Quiescence
Recent events expose a flaw in the predictive power of the dominant 
narrative in post-9/11 legal scholarship; that narrative envisions a country 
that veers off course at the onset of a military emergency but gradually 
steers back to a peacetime norm once the threat recedes, via primarily legal 
interventions. That model cannot explain a sudden return to the repressive 
wilderness just at the moment when it seemed the country had recovered its 
moral bearings. The problem, we suggest, has been a narrow focus on the 
structure and production of American legal institutions rather than on the 
actual operation of those institutions in society. We believe a more complete, 
and more accurate, perspective is to see courts, Congress, and the executive as 
players in a political theater. Their lines acquire meaning principally through 
their conversion into symbols of a particular social narrative. In this view, 
the Aug. 1, 2002 memos from the Office of Legal Counsel do not merely 
authorize particular interrogation methods; they are a symbol that can be 
used to mobilize support for a narrative about government overreaching, or, 
conversely, their repudiation can be used to paint a portrait of a dangerously 
naïve executive.
100. On support for waterboarding and “enhanced” techniques, see, e.g., Waterboarding Terror 
Suspects Unacceptable to Half of Americans, Angus Reid Public Opinion, Feb. 24, 
2010, available at http://www.visioncritical.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/2010.02.24_
Waterboard.pdf (39 percent of Americans, and 58 percent of Republicans, support 
water-boarding; 57 percent of Americans, and 77 percent of Republicans, support “enhanced 
interrogation techniques.”). On military commissions, see, e.g., Economist/YouGov Poll, 
Mar. 13–16, 2010, available at http://media.economist.com/images/pdf/Toplines20100318.pdf 
(58 percent of Americans favor military commissions.). For a summary of the polling data 
on torture from October, 2001, through the beginning of 2009, including the wording used, 
see Gronke, supra note 95, at 437–444. We do not exclude the possibility that there were other 
significant terrorist threats in 2009 of which the public is unaware. But for that very reason, 
they cannot have influenced the course of public opinion. The public only reacts to what it 
learns.
101. Writing in the Weekly Standard, for instance, Stephen Schwartz believed Reid’s indictment 
would “make it possible to trace, identify, and shut down Islamic extremist recruiting 
networks with which [Reid] had contact in the United States and Britain.” Stephen 
Schwartz, Recruiters for Jihad; Meet the Tablighi Jamaat—Right Here in the U.S.A., The 
Weekly Standard, Jan. 28, 2002 (copy on file with the authors). Other articles presented 
no inkling that Reid was anything other than a criminal who should be prosecuted to the 
full extent of the law. See, e.g., Deroy Murdock, Right Country, Wrong Camp, National 
Review, Jan. 25, 2002, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/205127/right-country-wrong-
camp/deroy-murdock; Robert A. Levy, Not on Our Soil, National Review, Jan. 25, 2002, 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3380 (“Plain and simple, military tribunals 
have no business on U.S. soil. So far, President Bush seems to agree. He should say so, 
unequivocally and soon.”); Theodore Dalrymple, Just Your Average Shoe-Bomber: “Not a 
Bad Lad,” and How Not To Be Had, National Review, Jan. 28, 2002.
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As the discussion in the second part of this essay makes clear, this orientation 
has not figured prominently in post-9/11 scholarship and is entirely absent 
from the dominant legal narrative of deviation and redemption. We do not 
purport to have definitive answers to the complex relationship between law 
and politics in the fraught area of national security, but one place to enter the 
discussion is to return to the related insights of Murray Edelman and Stuart 
Scheingold.102 Taken together, Edelman’s and Scheingold’s observations 
about the essential malleability of American popular opinion and the political 
nature of rights seems to account for the conundrum described in Part III and 
point to new directions in national security scholarship.
Beginning in 1964 with The Symbolic Uses of Politics, and continuing throughout 
a long and productive career, the late political scientist Murray Edelman 
struggled to understand poverty in America. For him, the conundrum 
was not simply that the condition existed and persisted, but that the poor 
were largely quiescent, apparently content with little more than symbolic 
participation in the democratic process, even though that process consistently 
failed to produce change and sometimes brought about policies that made 
the condition demonstrably worse. But unlike his contemporary Louis Hartz, 
who seized on America’s unswerving devotion to its liberal tradition as an 
explanation for its vitriolic hostility to socialism and class-based policies (a 
devotion Hartz derided as “irrational Lockeanism”), Edelman focused on the 
structure of American government and in particular on the distance between 
policy-makers and those they govern.
Edelman’s great contribution was a series of related observations into the 
operation of American government. Foremost, he recognized that for the 
overwhelming majority of Americans, politics is necessarily remote, especially 
at the national level. Most Americans cannot intelligently assess whether a 
particular national policy is a good or bad idea—whether, for instance, we 
should have a national health care policy, and whether it should include a 
public option, or even what a “public option” is—and therefore cannot be 
said in any meaningful way to demand one choice over another.103 And if it is 
true the public cannot intelligently evaluate most domestic policy initiatives, 
102. Edelman developed his ideas in a series of books and articles. See in particular Murray 
Edelman, Symbolic Uses of Politics (2d ed., Univ. of Illinois Press 1985); Edelman, Politics 
as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence (Markham Pub. Co. 1971); Edelman, 
Constructing the Political Spectacle (1st ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1988); Edelman, 
The Politics of Misinformation (1st ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001). For a discussion of 
Edelman’s legacy within the field of Law and Society, see Patricia Ewick & Austin Sarat, 
Hidden in Plain View: Murray Edelman in the Law and Society Tradition, 29 Law & Soc. 
Inquiry 439 (2006).
103. See, e.g., Edelman, Symbolic Uses, supra note 102, at 5–6 (“For most men most of the time, 
politics is a series of pictures in the mind, placed there by television news, newspapers, 
magazines, and discussions…. It is central to its potency as a symbol that it is remote, set 
apart, omnipresent as the ultimate threat or means of succor, yet not susceptible to effective 
influence through any act we as individuals can perform.”) (emphasis added). We do not 
mean to suggest that this idea originated with Edelman. The notion can be traced at least to 
1922, when Walter Lippman published Public Opinion (Free Press 1997) (1922).
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which could have an immediate impact on their lives, Edelman’s insight is 
all the more compelling in matters related to national security and foreign 
affairs, where the particulars of the debate are deliberately shrouded in secrecy 
and beyond the ken of all but a tiny number of esoteric specialists.104 This led 
Edelman to conclude that contrary to what was then the conventional wisdom 
among politicians, pundits, and journalists, American policy-makers do not 
respond to demands that bubble up from the American people. Instead, the 
American people form judgments about what they “want” with respect to 
remote issues, and whether those “wants” are being met, based on symbolic 
gestures and cues provided to them by trusted insiders and policy-makers who 
share their values, and who are believed to have access to the information that 
most Americans lack.105
Though Edelman grounded his writing in the social science research that 
was available to him, much of that research was in its infancy. As a result, 
Edelman’s early writing is largely impressionistic. But his theories have since 
been confirmed by decades of scholarship, particularly the rich literature 
on rational ignorance and democratic theory. For many years, countless 
studies and surveys have consistently shown that the majority of Americans 
are abysmally ignorant about even the most basic characteristics of the 
American political system, and even more so about the details of particular 
policy positions.106 A great deal of this literature explores how and to what 
104. In Symbolic Uses, Edelman speculated that his theories would explain public behavior 
vis-à-vis foreign affairs, but he did not undertake a demonstration to that effect until 
Politics as Symbolic Action. More recent research has confirmed the theory. See, e.g., William 
Howell & Douglas Kriner, Political Elites and Public Support for War (2007) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/colloquium/
international/Howell.pdf (“Whereas most citizens have immediate experiences on which 
to draw when formulating their domestic policy preferences, on questions of foreign policy 
these citizens lack direct experience or knowledge; and consequently…, citizens rely on elites 
both to acquire and process information about foreign affairs.”). For a discussion of survey 
data demonstrating voter ignorance about foreign affairs over many decades, see, e.g., Herbert 
H. Hyman & Paul B. Sheatsley, Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail, 11 Pub. 
Opinion Q. 412 (1947); Stephen E. Bennett, “Know-Nothings” Revisited: The Meaning 
of Political Ignorance Today, 69 Soc. Sci. Q. 476 (1988) [hereinafter “Know-Nothings” 
Revisited]; Stephen E. Bennett, “Know-Nothings” Revisited Again, 18 Pol. Behav. 219–31 
(1996) [hereinafter “Know-Nothings” Revisited Again]. For an insightful discussion penned 
during the McCarthy era of the perils of secrecy in national security, see Edward Shils, The 
Torment of Secrecy: The Background & Consequences of American Security Policies (Free 
Press 1956).
105. E.g., Edelman, Symbolic Uses, supra note 102, at 172–73 (“The mass public does not study 
and analyze detailed data about secondary boycotts, provisions for stock ownership and 
control in a proposed space communications corporation, or missile installations in Cuba. It 
ignores these things until political actions and speeches make them symbolically threatening 
or reassuring, and it then responds to the cues furnished by the actions and the speeches, 
not to direct knowledge of the facts. It is therefore political actions that chiefly shape men’s 
political wants and ‘knowledge,’ not the other way round. The common assumption that 
what democratic government does is somehow always a response to the moral codes, desires, 
and knowledge embedded inside people is as inverted as it is reassuring.”).
106. See, e.g., Michael X. Delli Carpini & Scott Keeter, What Americans Know About Politics and 
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extent American voters use “information shortcuts” to inform themselves 
about candidates and issues and thereby become intelligent participants in 
the electoral process.107 Most of these shortcuts amount to heuristics that 
allow voters to substitute the judgment of others for their own investigation. 
Our concern is not whether these shortcuts work, though some scholars have 
expressed skepticism.108 Rather, our point is that scholars agree these shortcuts 
are widely employed, and that Americans get their information about remote 
issues from others, including most prominently the cues and messages of those 
people and institutions perceived to be in the know or allied with their view of 
the world. As Dan Kahan and Donald Braman recently put the matter:
[C]itizens aren’t in a position to figure out through personal investigation 
whether the death penalty deters, gun control undermines public safety, 
commerce threatens the environment, et cetera. They have to take the word 
of those whom they trust on issues of what sorts of empirical claims and what 
sorts of data supporting such claims, are credible. The people they trust, 
naturally, are the ones who share their values—and who…are predisposed to 
a particular view.109
At the same time, and drawing on emerging research in social psychology, 
Edelman theorized that remote attachments to contentious national issues are 
paradoxical: On the one hand, they are apt to be intensely expressed and to 
generate fierce political passions. Yet on the other hand, for most Americans, 
the attachments are ephemeral and quickly forgotten, depending on how they 
are packaged and presented to the American public. 
One example illustrates the malleability of contemporary political debates, 
particularly regarding national security or foreign affairs. In an address to a 
joint session of Congress in April, 1983, Ronald Reagan famously warned that 
the communist Sandinistas of Nicaragua were “just as close to Miami, San 
Antonio, San Diego, and Tucson as those cities are to Washington.” After 
recounting the alleged perfidies of the Nicaraguan communists, as well as 
Why It matters (Yale Univ. Press 1996); Bennett, “Know-Nothings” Revisited, supra note 
104: Bennett, “Know-Nothings” Revisited Again, supra note 104.
107. See, e.g., John Gastil, Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, The “Wildavsky 
Heuristic”: The Cultural Orientation of Mass Political Opinion, preliminary draft available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=834264 (discussing literature).
108. See, e.g. Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 Critical Review 413 (1998).
109. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 Yale L. & 
Pol. Rev. 149 (2006). This research has important implications for efforts to trace the arc 
of American thought on a given issue, since it implies that the range of messages heard on 
a remote issue will strongly influence the course of American thought. If, for instance, the 
range shifts to the right or left, or narrows around a particular consensus, American thought 
on the issue will follow suit. See, e.g., John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion 
11–15 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1992); Benjamin Page, Robert Shapiro, & Glenn R. Dempsey, 
What Moves Public Opinion, 81 Am. Pol. Sci. R. 23 (1987); Adam J. Berinsky, Assuming 
the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict, 69 J. 
of Pol. 975 (2007) (documenting shifts in public opinion when elites “come to a common 
interpretation of a political reality.”). These, however, are matters for another day.
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their supposedly enthusiastic embrace of Moscow, Reagan asked rhetorically—
in language worth recalling today—whether democracies must “remain passive 
while threats to their security and prosperity accumulate?”
Must we just accept the destabilization of an entire region from the Panama 
Canal to Mexico on our southern border? Must we sit by while independent 
nations of this hemisphere are integrated into the most aggressive empire the 
modern world has seen? Must we wait while Central Americans are driven 
from their homes like the more than a million who’ve sought refuge out of 
Afghanistan?”110
With this, Reagan roused Americans to support a policy initiative that 
had only the most remote connection to their lives, but which signaled their 
support for the equally remote, but symbolically powerful struggle against 
communism. Yet the majority of Americans had no idea what the American 
position was with respect to the Sandinistas, just as they later had no idea 
who the mujahideen in Afghanistan were, or why there would be “more than 
a million” refugees from the Afghan war.111 So when it came time to view the 
mujahideen as terrorists, the American public could make the transition with 
Orwellian ease.112
Sadly, history presents a ready supply of these bewildering transformations 
in America’s foreign policy preferences. The classic example is the post-war 
re-imagining of Germany and the Germans from demonic incarnation of evil 
to democracy-loving, anti-communist stalwarts and allies—the metamorphosis 
that figured among Orwell’s inspirations for 1984.113 But an even more striking 
illustration, if perhaps less commented upon, was the juxtaposition in the 
perception of the Japanese and our former allies, the Russians and Chinese. 
As the historian John Dower has artfully shown, within weeks of the war’s 
end, the iconic wartime image of the Japanese—the rapacious, blood-soaked, 
and savage ape—was softened and replaced with the inquisitive, imitative, and 
child-like chimp, resting on the broad shoulders of his American protectors 
110. Presidential Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Central America (April 
27, 1983), available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/42783d.htm 
(emphasis added).
111. Zaller, supra note 109, at 25.
112. Almost immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, pundits began to express fear 
about the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, quickly dubbed “the Green Peril.” See, e.g., 
Amos Perlmutter, Wishful Thinking about Islamic Fundamentalism, Washington Post, Jan. 
19, 1992 (“Islamic fundamentalism is an aggressive revolutionary movement as militant and 
violent as the Bolshevik, Fascist, and Nazi movements of the past,” and cannot be reconciled 
with the “Christian-secular universe”); Judith Miller, The Islamic Wave, The New York 
Times, May 31, 1992, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/31/magazine/the-islamic-
wave.html. Some foresaw the danger in the new demonization. See, e.g., Leon Hadar, The 
“Green Peril”: Creating the Islamic Fundamentalist Threat, CATO Pol. Anal. No. 177 (Aug. 
27, 1992).
113. This was also the example Edelman used. Edelman, Symbolic Uses, supra note 102, at 173–76.
461
who would educate him in the ways of democracy.114 Gen. Douglas MacArthur 
later made this explicit, explaining to the Senate that his philosophy during 
the occupation had been to treat the Japanese as twelve-year-olds. “Measured 
by the standards of modern civilization,” he said, “they would be like a boy of 
[twelve]…. Like any tuitionary period, they were susceptible to following new 
models. You can implant basic concepts there. There were still close enough 
to origin to be elastic and acceptable to new concepts….”115
Meanwhile, as the Japanese were quickly recast as eager and harmless 
students of the American Way, first the Russians and then the Chinese were 
cast with the old wartime stereotypes. “Traits which the Americans and English 
had associated with the Japanese, with great empirical sobriety, were suddenly 
perceived to be really more relevant to the communists (deviousness and 
cunning, bestial and atrocious behavior, homogeneity and monolithic control, 
fanaticism divorced from any legitimate goals…).” And when China joined 
the communist camp, the favorable traits attributed to the Chinese during 
the war—their individualism and love of democracy—suddenly disappeared, 
replaced by “the old, monolithic, inherently totalitarian raiments the Japanese 
were shedding. They became the unthinking horde; the fanatics…; the new 
Yellow Peril.” Experts quickly emerged to explain their “true” character. 
Edmund Chubb, a diplomat and leading China specialist, assured Americans 
that the Chinese “do not think like other men.” Instead, they acted out of a 
“madness born of xenophobia.”116
If Edelman’s first insight was that most Americans have only a remote 
attachment to national controversies, and that public engagement with these 
controversies is apt to be particularly susceptible to symbolic manipulation, 
his second was to explain how such an attachment could come under siege 
and collapse. Edelman observed what today is commonplace—that crisis is a 
much more potent political resource than calm. Every politician, as well as 
every journalist, community organizer, fundraiser, and advertising executive, 
understands that a loss can produce a sense of threat and mobilize people to 
act, while success invariably encourages complacency and quiescence.117
In 1974, Edelman’s insights received an important elaboration when his 
colleague at the University of Wisconsin, Stuart Scheingold, published 
The Politics of Rights. Where Edelman focused his attention on the political 
114. John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War 302 (Pantheon 
1986).
115. U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, 82d 
Cong., 1: 312–313 (1951) (Hearings To Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the 
Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 
from His Assignments in that Area).
116. Dower, supra note 114, at 309. Another example of this phenomenon was the rapid re-
imagining of the Germans at the end of World War I. See Gary Gerstle, The Immigrant as 
Threat to American Security: A Historical Perspective, in The Maze of Fear: Security and 
Migration after 9/11 96–97 (John Tirman, ed., New Press 2004).
117. See Edelman, supra note 102.
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branches, Scheingold tried to understand why judicial decisions conferring 
“rights” upon marginalized groups so infrequently led to meaningful change 
in the condition that prompted the litigation, a riddle Scheingold thought 
particularly anomalous given the widespread tendency in American society 
to equate law with moral legitimacy.118 Why, in other words, were courts 
universally respected but their pronouncements generally ignored, and what 
did this paradox tell us about the nature of rights in American society?
His answer to these questions, much simplified here, was that rights are best 
understood as contingent political resources, rather than entitlements that 
could be cashed in like coupons in a grocery store. Scheingold theorized that 
rights awarded by courts acquired broader symbolic significance as soon as 
they entered the cultural and political bloodstream. Depending on how those 
symbols were received and manipulated, they were capable of commanding 
financial resources, conferring legitimacy, and generating expectations, as 
well as encouraging resistance and stimulating opposition—a phenomenon 
Scheingold called, “the politics of rights.”119 Building on Edelman’s ideas 
of remoteness, quiescence, and threat, Scheingold theorized that a judicial 
declaration of rights could, and probably would, calm some even as it alarmed 
others. In that way, the decree itself could generate opposition that previously 
did not exist, providing political resources that could be marshaled in a 
campaign to limit or marginalize the decree. The result could be the emergence 
of a vigorous backlash against a decision that, at least at the time, seemed 
supported by a broad social consensus.120
A potent illustration of the politics of rights is the political and social 
reaction to the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia, which struck 
down then-existing death penalty statutes. In the years prior to Furman, the 
death penalty had come under increasing attack from leading intellectuals, 
prominent politicians, editorialists, and religious organizations.121 Juries 
had been sentencing fewer and fewer people to die, and protracted appeals 
prevented executions. After 105 executions in 1951, there were fifty-six in 1960. 
118. Scheingold acknowledged his heavy debt to the earlier work of Judith Shklar. Shklar 
defined legalism as “the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule 
following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules.” 
Shklar, Legalism 1 (Harvard Univ. Press 1964). More recently, Mary Ann Glendon made 
the same point: “This legalization of popular culture is both cause and consequence of our 
increasing tendency to look to law as an expression of the few values that are widely shared 
in our society: liberty, equality, and the ideal of justice under law…. Legality, to a great extent, 
has become a touchstone for legitimacy.” Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political 
Discourse 3 (Free Press 1991) (emphasis added). For a discussion of Scheingold’s debt to, 
and development of, Edelman’s theories, see Ewick & Sarat, Hidden in Plain View, supra 
note 102, at 444.
119. Scheingold, supra note 9, at 83–148.
120. In the first edition, Scheingold paid scant attention to counter-mobilizations and backlash. 
He remedied the deficiency in the second edition. Id. at xxxii–xxxvii.
121. Stuart Banner, The Death Penalty: An American History 240–41 (Harvard Univ. Press 
2003).
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Five years later, there were only seven, and in June, 1967, Colorado carried out 
what would be the last execution in the United States for a decade.122 State 
legislatures responded to these developments with a flurry of activity. By 1969, 
fourteen states had abolished the death penalty and several others came close. 
In 1957, the California Assembly and the Illinois legislature passed six-year 
moratoria on executions, which Illinois renewed in 1967. Meanwhile, public 
opinion polls showed decreasing support—and more importantly, no apparent 
enthusiasm—for the ultimate sanction.123 By 1972, there seemed to be a cultural 
consensus against capital punishment.
Yet the day after the Supreme Court decision in Furman, legislators in five 
states announced their intention to introduce bills that would restore the 
death penalty. President Nixon charged the FBI with providing him with 
the names of convicted killers who had committed a second murder after 
being released from prison. In November, 1972, a few months after Furman, 
voters in California overwhelmingly supported an amendment to the state 
constitution to allow for capital punishment. By 1976, thirty-five states plus 
the federal government had enacted new death penalty statutes.124 The shift in 
public opinion was equally dramatic. A few months before Furman, supporters 
of capital punishment outnumbered opponents by only eight percentage 
points; a few months after, the number grew to twenty-five points. By the 
time the Court revisited the issue in 1976, supporters outnumbered opponents 
65 percent to 28 percent, the widest gap since the early 1950s.125 As the legal 
historian Stuart Banner observed, “Furman suddenly made capital punishment 
a more salient issue than it had been in decades, perhaps ever. People who 
previously had had little occasion to think about the death penalty now saw it 
on the front page of the newspaper. Furman, like other landmark cases, had the 
effect of calling its opponents to action.”126
Taken together, the insights from Edelman and Scheingold about the 
operation of law in society allow us to see post-9/11 events in an entirely different 
light. What practitioners, clinicians, and the legal academy conceived as an 
argument about “rights” and the optimal structure of American government is 
better understood as a battle over political resources and how they have been, 
and continue to be, mobilized to create narratives about national identity—an 
identity that is alternately threatened or calmed depending on the symbolic 
manipulation of unfolding events.127 In this view, for instance, the suspension 
122. Id. at 244–46.
123. Id. at 240–44.
124. Id. at 267–68.
125. Id. at 268.
126. Id. at 268–69.
127. Leti Volpp has made a similar point about the role of the “other” (or the non-citizen, or the 
terrorist) in the construction of national identity. Leti Volpp, The Culture of Citizenship, 
8 Theoretical Inquiries L. 571 (2007) (considering headscarf ban in France and contrasting 
treatment of Jose Padilla and John Walker Lindh).
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of habeas corpus should not be understood as simply a counter-terror policy 
that expands or contracts the rights of some interested group, or even as a 
policy that is or is not illegal. Instead, it should be understood in the way it 
was actually used—viz., as a political resource that was marshaled to contribute 
to competing narratives, one of official indifference to that magically potent 
symbol of American identity, “the Rule of Law,” and another of official 
commitment to a different but similarly potent symbol, “National Security.”
The nexus to “law” is, therefore, largely instrumental.128 The ability to fashion 
the superior legal argument is most useful insofar as it increases the value 
of the political resource for one narrative or another.129 Litigation battles join 
academic condemnation and white papers from NGOs condemning torture, 
rendition or indefinite detention, all of which are accompanied by a press 
release and eminently quotable executive summaries. These cultural products 
combine with press coverage of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, or news of 
prisoner deaths in secret CIA black sites, which appears alongside news that 
yet another aspect of the Bush Administration policy has been struck down by 
the Supreme Court, which is handed down the day before the release of yet 
another book criticizing the lawlessness of the Bush Administration’s policy, 
followed the next day by release of the torture memos and a new poll showing 
that a majority of Americans now think the Bush Administration is indifferent 
to civil liberties, which leads to another round of editorializing, white papers, 
128. See, e.g., Howell & Kriner, supra note 104, at 4. This discussion obviously links to the vigorous 
debate over whether social reform litigation “works.” Gerald N. Rosenberg, in The Hollow 
Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, expresses considerable doubt about 
whether the courts can be successful, either directly or indirectly, in bringing about social 
change. Our position is more modulated. All litigation produces an outcome. As we have 
described, in socially contentious litigation, that outcome is a political resource which can 
be used to contribute to a social narrative. At least vis-à-vis social reform, the litigation 
“works” only to the extent that narrative prevails in society in an enduring way, such that 
the outcome achieved in the litigation is secure from political rollback. Viewed in this light, 
it is very difficult to pronounce the post-9/11 detention litigation as a success, despite the 
many victories in the Supreme Court. This understanding, however, should not be taken to 
imply that litigation is powerless for an individual client in an individual case. Obviously 
that is not true, as any successful civil rights plaintiff can attest. Nor does it mean that the 
Guantánamo habeas litigation did not in the end contribute to some prisoners securing their 
freedom. Clearly it did, and for them, the litigation “worked” in the evident sense that they 
are free today and may not have been but for the litigation. But if the measure of success 
is either meaningful judicial supervision of executive detentions in the war on terror, or the 
creation of an enduring social narrative against unfettered executive detention, then it is 
hard to consider the litigation to have been a success.
129. This is precisely what happened when U.S. District Judge Anna Diggs Taylor held that 
the warrantless wiretapping program was unconstitutional. Media outlets identified the 
most quotable sections of her opinion, which figured prominently in their coverage. See, e.g., 
MSNBC, Feds Appeal Ruling Against Wiretap Program, Aug. 18, 2006, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/14393611/ (“‘There are no hereditary Kings in America and no powers not 
created by the Constitution. So all ’inherent powers’ must derive from that Constitution,” 
Taylor wrote in her 43-page opinion. “The public interest is clear, in this matter. It is the 
upholding of our Constitution,” she wrote) (last visited Oct. 18, 2010). By the time the 
Sixth Circuit overturned the decision, the narrative had already absorbed the value of her 
(perhaps unwitting) contribution and moved on.
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law review articles…. In this way, a narrative is born, and along with it, the 
appearance of a broad cultural consensus.
But this apparent consensus, like the “consensus” against capital 
punishment in 1972, is likely to be a mile wide but an inch deep. For the vast 
majority of Americans, counter-terror policy is distant and opaque, operating 
in a world set apart from their daily existence and beyond their power to 
control. They have no direct access to the relevant information and cannot 
assess which of the many contested claims are true. Are the prisoners at 
Guantánamo innocent men, wrongly detained and horribly mistreated? Or 
coddled terrorists committed to destruction and mayhem? Can they be put 
on trial in federal court or paroled into the United States? Or would they 
overwhelm our courts and disappear into the shadows? The great majority 
of Americans cannot answer these questions for themselves, so they look to 
cues and messages from trusted insiders who they believe have access to the 
facts they lack. And because the debate touches on the essential symbols of 
American national identity, they listen in particular to those who affirm their 
vision of America.
President Obama’s speech on national security May 21, 2009 at the 
National Archives is a case study in symbolic reassurance. As a number of 
observers have noted, despite Obama’s campaign promises, his post-9/11 
counter-terror policies are most striking for their similarity to Bush’s, rather 
than their differences, which are mostly modest and incremental.130 Yet in his 
only major speech on national security, Obama—invoking the mythical power 
of the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of Rights—
said the Bush Administration “went off course” when it made a series of “hasty 
decisions” that “established an ad hoc legal approach for fighting terrorism…
that failed to rely on our legal traditions and time-tested institutions, and that 
failed to use our values as a compass.” To correct these mistakes, Obama said he 
had made “dramatic changes” that represented “a new direction from the last 
eight years,” and that his approach to terrorism, unlike that of his predecessor, 
was faithful to “our most fundamental values…[to] liberty and justice in this 
country, and a light that shines for all who seek freedom, fairness, equality, 
130. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, Establishing a New Normal: National Security, 
Civil Liberties and Human Rights Under the Obama Administration, July 2010, available 
at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/EstablishingNewNormal.pdf; Massimo Calabresi & 
Michael Weisskopf, The Fall of Greg Craig, Time, Nov. 19, 2009, available at http://www.
time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1940537,00.html; Owen Fiss, Obama’s Betrayal: His 
Guantánamo Policy Violates the Principle of Freedom, Slate, Dec. 4, 2009, available at http://
www.slate.com/id/2237389/ (“[T]he sad fact is that Obama has not carried through on [his] 
promise and now presides over the very horror he himself had the courage to denounce.”); 
Amy Davidson, Close Read: What’s Going on at Bagram, New Yorker, Sept. 14, 2009, 
available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2009/09/close-read-whats-
going-on-at-bagram.html; Jack Goldsmith, The Cheney Fallacy: Why Barack Obama is 
waging a more effective war on terror than George W. Bush, The New Republic, May 18, 
2009, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/the-cheney-fallacy. The authors agree 
with these assessments.
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and dignity around the world.” These changes, he vowed, would allow us to 
resume our timeless “American journey…toward a more perfect union.”131
This rhetoric built on both the anti-Bush narrative of indifference to the 
rule of law and Obama’s campaign promise of change. The speech left a 
powerful impression that the Obama Administration had reclaimed America’s 
moral standing, ending the abuses of a shameful past, and returning to our 
foundational principles. At least for those who are inclined to look to Obama 
as a trusted voice, his speech provided all the reassurance they could possibly 
want that change had finally come, and that the democratic process worked. 
Obama had reaffirmed their vision of American identity as a law-abiding and 
honorable nation, committed to a set of ideals that had been cast aside in 
the madness after 9/11. Lost in the comforting rhetoric, however, were the 
policy details, which included—for the first time in U.S. history—support for 
a preventive detention regime, something even the Bush Administration had 
not proposed.132
Among opponents to Bush-era policies, Obama’s remarks produced 
quiescence and calm, a sense that the nation had finally “recovered” and that 
attention could safely be devoted to more pressing matters like the economy. But 
immediately after Obama’s speech, the cameras shifted to former Vice President 
Cheney, who offered a vigorous defense of Bush-era counter-terror policies, 
including in particular Guantánamo and the use of “enhanced interrogation 
techniques.” Relying on his position as an insider with presumed access to 
secrets unknown to most Americans, Cheney hinted darkly of the dangers 
that would befall Americans now that President Obama was carving holes in 
131. See Remarks by the President on National Security at the National Archives, 
May 21, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/.
132. Id. (“Now, finally, there remains the question of detainees at Guantánamo who cannot be 
prosecuted yet who pose a clear danger to the American people. And I have to be honest 
here—this is the toughest single issue that we will face. We’re going to exhaust every avenue 
that we have to prosecute those at Guantánamo who pose a danger to our country. But even 
when this process is complete, there may be a number of people who cannot be prosecuted 
for past crimes, in some cases because evidence may be tainted, but who nonetheless pose 
a threat to the security of the United States…. Let me repeat: I am not going to release 
individuals who endanger the American people.”). We should note here a disagreement 
between the authors. Margulies accepts that the United States may detain prisoners for the 
duration of hostilities in Afghanistan, at least so long as Congress continues to authorize 
military force and combat operations there remain ongoing, and provided the detention 
is subject to adequate habeas review. He maintains, however, that if a prisoner prevails 
in habeas he must be released, and understands the Obama Administration to take the 
position that a prisoner may be held indefinitely, without criminal charges and even if the 
United States loses in habeas, based solely on a prediction of future dangerousness. That 
is the essence of preventive detention and is illegal. Metcalf, by contrast, contends that 
because the United States is no longer engaged in an ongoing international armed conflict 
recognizable under international humanitarian law, prisoners captured in the so-called “war 
on terror” must either be criminally charged (either under U.S., Afghan, or other domestic 
law), detained pursuant to Afghan law in a manner that meets international human rights 
standards, or released.
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the security net carefully woven by the Bush Administration.133 Republicans 
have hammered on this theme throughout Obama’s Administration (just as, 
it must be acknowledged, Democrats hammered on the theme of lawlessness 
and incompetence throughout the Bush Administration).134
Both speeches presented powerful narratives that appealed to particular 
audiences. But where Obama’s speech produced quiescence, Cheney’s 
produced the far more potent sense of threat. Once again, the nation was 
dangerously at risk and no more pressing matter faced the country than to 
thwart Obama’s recklessness.135 In reflecting on the relative impact of these 
two speeches, it is worth recalling the nature of counter-terror policy in the 
American imagination. It exists only as a collection of evocative images and 
ideas—black sites, torture, Guantánamo, terrorists—all of which are entwined 
with the most powerful political symbols in American life: race, national 
security, and the most elusive of all, “American values.” This intimate 
connection not only to our perceived safety but to our most potent national 
symbols means that Americans can be roused to attach inordinate significance 
to the debates, creating the appearance of a cultural consensus. But at the 
same time, their attachments will be superficial and easily changed, perhaps 
with bewildering rapidity.136
133. Cheney’s speech was delivered at the American Enterprise Institute. See Richard B. Cheney, 
Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute, May 21, 2009, available at http://www.aei.org/
speech/100050.
134. For some of the many examples, see, e.g., J.D. Gordon, 5 Reasons We’re Not as Safe with 
Obama in the White House, Fox News, April 13, 2010, available at http://www.foxnews.com/
opinion/2010/04/13/jd-gordon-obama-terror-al-qaeda-safe-america-nuclear-disarmament/; 
Rep. Mac Thornberry, Terrorism Policy Risks Disaster, Politico, May 6, 2010, available at 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0510/36834.html; Marc Theissen, U.S. may be 
passing up chances to stop terrorist plots, Washington Post, May 11, 2010, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/10/AR2010051002174.html.
135. This helps explain one of the many oddities of contemporary American public opinion. 
Though Obama’s policies are generally indistinguishable from those in place at the end of 
the Bush years, public opinion polls consistently show that Republicans, by a substantial 
margin, believe Obama’s policies have made the nation less safe than when Bush was in 
office, while Democrats, by similar majorities, believe the opposite. See, e.g., Quinnipiac 
Polling Institute, Obama’s Approval Splits Evenly for First Time, Quinnipiac University 
National Poll Finds; Voters Split on Whether First Year Is Success or Failure, Jan. 13, 2010, 
available at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1284.xml?ReleaseID=1411&What=obama&strArea=
;&strTime=9. Polling throughout 2010, though less detailed, has consistently shown that 
Republicans strongly disapprove of Obama’s terror policies and Democrats just as strongly 
approve. See, e.g., Quinnipiac University National Poll, U.S. Voters Say Gays In Military 
Should Come Out, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Voters Want Military Trials 
for Terror Suspects, Feb 10, 2010, available at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1284.xml?Rele
aseID=1422&What=obama&strArea=;&strTime=9; Quinnipiac University National Poll, 
Senate Should Ratify Nuclear Disarmament Treaty, U.S. Voters Tell Quinnipiac University 
National Poll; Obama Not Strong Enough On Israel, Voters Say, April 10, 2010, available at 
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1284.xml?What=obama&strArea=;&strTime=9&ReleaseID=14
48#Question003.
136. There is evidence that at least some members of the Obama Administration were caught 
off guard by the speed with which an apparent consensus can shift. White House Counsel 
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For the moment, it seems that the success of Obama’s narrative produced 
quiescence on the Left and alarm on the Right. Conservatives were invigorated 
and mobilized just as the Left was abandoning the public square. The result 
has been a counter-mobilization against Obama and his national security 
policies that was much more vitriolic and effective than anything during the 
campaign.137
*     *     *
The foregoing is simply one attempt at a scholarship that goes beyond 
the “myth of rights” and takes account of the broader historical, social and 
political context for U.S. reactions to terrorism. But we note that other 
disciplines are ahead of the legal academy in this regard. Many scholars—
notably in socio-legal studies, history and political science—have probed the 
causes and consequences of U.S. counterterrorism policies.138 Sociologists 
have explored various explanations for post-9/11 policies, from consumerism139 
Greg Craig had initial responsibility for implementing the administration’s Guantánamo 
policy. According to published reports, Craig was surprised and taken aback at the 
resistance generated by Obama’s decision to close the base. See Anne E. Kornblut & Dafna 
Linzer, White House Regroups on Guantánamo, Counsel Craig Replaced as Point Man on 
Issue as Deadline for Closing Looms, Washington Post, Sept. 25, 2009, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/24/AR2009092404893.html 
(quoting Craig: “I thought there was, in fact, and I may have been wrong, a broad consensus 
about the importance to our national security objectives to close Guantánamo and how 
keeping Guantánamo open actually did damage to our national security objectives.”).
137. We note that the anti-Bush narrative was substantially advanced by other developments 
that bore little relation to his counter-terror policies but which could be taken as evidence 
that the narrative was true. The fiasco in Iraq and the disastrous response to Hurricane 
Katrina, for instance, contributed to the view that the Bush team did not adequately plan 
for contingencies and was so blinded by its ideology that it was unprepared for the reality of 
events. Likewise, the anti-Obama narrative has been powerfully fueled by resentment over 
his health care and economic policies, all of which merge into a narrative of big government 
run amok, with the traditional Democratic attachment to exorbitant social programs at the 
expense of national security. This illustrates the familiar psychological principle of biased 
assimilation, by which observers make sense of new events by fitting them into pre-existing 
understandings. See Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and 
Attitude Polarization: The Effect of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 
37 J. Personality and Soc. Psychol. 2098 (1979); Kahan & Braman, supra note 109.
138. Other scholars applied lessons from other disciplines, such as political science, to the 
Supreme Court’s decisions regarding detainees’ rights. Fallon, supra note 65, at 396 (“Lawyers 
who want to understand constitutional law must attend to the role of actors besides the 
Supreme Court in shaping the domain of politically tolerable assertions of judicial power.”).
139. Timothy Recuber, The Terrorist as Folk Devil and Mass Commodity: Moral Panics, Risk 
and Consumer Culture, 9 J. Inst. Just. Int’l Stud. 158 (2009) (describing reaction to terrorism 
as “moral panic” fueled by mass media and consumerism); Dana Heller, Introduction: 
Consuming 9/11, in The Selling of 9/11: How a National Tragedy Became a Commodity 
(Dana Heller ed., Palgrave MacMillan 2005).
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to media portrayals of crime140 to the politics of fear generally.141 As Jonathan 
Simon observed, from a socio-legal perspective, post-9/11 policies were not the 
exception but “only the latest effort to redefine the scope of the U.S. federal 
government’s power (and especially the executive branch) by invoking the 
metaphor of war.”142 Legal historians also noted continuities, especially with 
respect to the historic U.S. antipathy to prisoners’ dignity and humanity143 as 
well as the long-standing presence of terrorism on U.S. soil.144 Mary Dudziak 
has probed the foundations of the dominant emergency framing, arguing that 
“[i]deas about the temporality of war are embedded in American legal thought 
[which are] in tension with the experience of war in the twentieth century. 
The problem of time, in essence, clouds an understanding of the problem 
140. David L. Altheide, The Mass Media, Crime and Terrorism, 4 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 982, 
997 (2006) (arguing that experience of terrorism suspect Abdullah Al-Kidd was “similar 
to millions of current and former prison inmates, whose identity has been reconstructed 
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of war.”145 And cultural critics have provided much needed context for U.S. 
torture policies146 and reactions to “Islamic extremism.”147
An emerging group of legal scholars—whom we might term “integrationists”—
have examined the continuities between post-9/11 policies and American 
practices and attitudes toward crime, risk, security, and socially constructed 
“others.”148 As argued by John Parry,149 Judith Resnik,150 and James Foreman,151 
post-9/11 policies are neither sui generis nor likely to disappear at the end of 
this “war,” whenever that might be. The struggle against abusive treatment 
and confinement of terrorism suspects will undoubtedly persist over the long-
term, and we are best served by broadening our lens to consider how post-9/11 
policies repeat, reflect, and inform broader U.S. policies towards marginalized 
people such as prisoners and non-citizens. Muneer Ahmad has begun the 
difficult task of questioning whether a rights-based strategy can possibly be 
effective in the political context of Guantánamo,152 and most fundamentally, we 
must heed the admonition of Richard Fallon, who recently and quite properly 
observed that “the Constitution is ‘politically constructed’ by the tolerances of 
Congress and the president, as supported by public opinion.”153
V. Conclusions and Implications
From the vantage of 2010, it appears the interventionist position—our 
position—has failed. As we see it, it failed because it was premised upon a 
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legalistic view of rights that simply cannot be squared with the reality of 
the American political experience. Yet the interventionist stance holds an 
undeniable attraction. Of all the positions advanced since 9/11, it holds out 
the best promise of preserving the pluralist ideals of a liberal democracy. 
The challenge going forward, therefore, is to re-imagine the interventionist 
intellectual endeavor. To retain relevance, we must translate the lessons of the 
social sciences into the language of the law, which likely requires that we knock 
law from its lofty perch. As a beginning, scholarship should be more attuned 
to the limitations of the judiciary, and mindful of the complicated tendency of 
narratives to generate backlash and counter-narratives.
But there is another tendency we must resist, and that is the impulse to 
nihilism—to throw up our hands in despair, with the lament that nothing 
works and repression is inevitable. Just how to integrate the political and the 
ideal is, of course, a problem that is at least as old as legal realism itself and 
one we do not purport to solve in this essay.154 Still, we are heartened by the 
creative work undertaken in other arenas, ranging from poverty law to gay 
rights, that explores how, done properly, lawyering (and even litigation) can 
make real differences in the lives of marginalized people.155 We hope that the 
next decade of reflections on the policies undertaken in the name of national 
security will follow their lead in probing not just what the law should be, but 
how it functions and whom it serves.
We close this essay on a personal note. Margulies was counsel of record 
in Rasul v. Bush. He and his colleagues at the Center for Constitutional 
Rights began work on that litigation in November, 2001, not long after Alan 
Dershowitz first started to press his proposal for “torture warrants.” By the 
time this essay appears, Margulies’ uninterrupted involvement in these issues 
will have lasted more than nine years, with no sign of ending anytime soon. 
He vividly recalls the state of play when Rasul was filed in February, 2002, 
and when one of his co-counsel received a death threat at his home in New 
Orleans. With considerable regret, Margulies now looks back on Rasul as 
a failure. But in 2002, there was no other choice. The Bush Administration 
had created a prison beyond the law, Congress was a stony monolith, and 
the parents and family of lost prisoners pleaded that their loved ones not be 
abandoned. At that moment, there was no choice but to litigate. He would do 
it again tomorrow, were the circumstances the same. His mistake, for which 
he takes sole responsibility, was to believe that law, in an intensely legalistic 
society, was enough.
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